


Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan

June 2013 – December 2014



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PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

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Printed in Pakistan

Published: February 2015

ISBN:978-969-558-476-7

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PREFACE

The **Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan, June 2013 – December 2014** is a report prepared by PILDAT to evaluate the quality of democracy in Pakistan during this period.

The report period has been calculated from June 05, 2014, the date the newly-elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, MNA, took oath of office, to December 31, 2014, the end of the calendar year.

Although the beginning of the period under consideration saw the first ever civilian transfer of power, along with other developments that greatly supported the quality of democracy in Pakistan, the subsequent 18 months of the PML-N Government saw, in PILDAT's opinion a gradual deterioration of the quality of the democracy. The period is therefore characterized by tumultuous developments such as the protests carried out by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) against alleged massive rigging in General Election 2013, increased incidents of terrorism, the rise of the Military in domains which are usually considered to be under the ambit of the civilian Government, etc.

The report is based on data analysis and scores compiled by the PILDAT Team under the leadership of *Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob*, President, *Ms. Aasiya Riaz*, Joint Director, and researched and coordinated by *Mr. Muhammad Saad*, Assistant Projects Officer. Dr. Niaz Murtaza, Senior Fellow at the UC Berkley and a specialist in Political Economy and Development, has been commissioned by PILDAT as the lead author who has written the report under guidance from

PILDAT's Democracy Assessment Group (DAG).

In order to facilitate his research, PILDAT has made use of the following three methodologies:

- i. A close monitoring of the democracy developments throughout the period
- ii. A quantitative assessment of the quality of democracy based on scores by PILDAT's Democracy Assessment Group (DAG) which consists of eminent personalities representing different walks of life. These scores were taken for two periods, which were for June 2013 – July 2014 and August 2014 – December 2014
- iii. Use of a PILDAT Public Opinion Poll on the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan, July 2013- August 2014

Acknowledgments

PILDAT would like to acknowledge the guidance and support provided by the members of the Democracy Assessment Group (DAG). Members of the Group have reviewed the report in detail and made invaluable contributions.

This report has been prepared by PILDAT by the support of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Government of Denmark. We wish to thank them for their support and reiterate that the views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Government of Denmark.

Islamabad
February 2015

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANP	Awami National Party
BNP-M	Balochistan National Party – Mengal
CM	Chief Minister
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam – Fazl (JUI-F)
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MQM	Muttahida Quami Movement
NA	National Assembly of Pakistan
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NEPRA	National Electric Power Regulatory Authority
NSC	National Security Committee
OGRA	National Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PBA	Pakistan Broadcasters’ Association
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
PILDAT	Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PM	Prime Minister
PMAP	Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz
PPPP	Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
SC	Supreme Court of Pakistan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PILDAT has been assessing the quality of Pakistani democracy since 2002. Its annual assessments are based on its analysis of major events that have affected the quality of democracy during the period under consideration, scores by a Democracy Assessment Group (DAG) consisting of eminent Pakistanis from different walks of life and a representative national public opinion survey. This report assesses the quality of democracy from **June 2013 to December 2014** based on two DAG rating exercises undertaken for the periods **June 2013 - July 2014** and **August 2014 – December 2014** and one public opinion survey undertaken in June 2014. The report's objectives are:

- i) Increased awareness among the public, Media and Parliamentarians about the performance of democratic governance and institutions
- ii) Greater realization about introducing reforms to address the weaknesses in the democratic system.

2014 was an eventful year compared even with normally tumultuous Pakistani politics. Unlike the past years where external events such as different developments related to Pakistan-US relations such as the Memogate Scandal, and the raid carried out on the compound of Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011, left a heavy imprint on Pakistan's democracy, mainly domestic events

Not only did the negative developments and factors outnumber the positive ones, they also outweighed them, considering there were considerable doubts regarding the continuity of the current Government

proved critical in June 2013 – December 2014.

Although the period under consideration started off on a high note with a smooth civilian transfer after General Election 2013, the announcement of the High Treason trial against Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf by the Prime Minister, etc., **the quality of democracy, according to this report, deteriorated by the end of December 2014.** Not only did the negative developments and factors outnumber the positive ones, they also outweighed them, considering that at the height of the sit-ins staged by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) in August 2014, there were considerable doubts regarding the continuity of the current Government or even the democratic setup. Some of these positive and negative factors and developments are outlined below.

Factors and Developments Positively Affecting the Quality of Democracy

The **smooth civilian transition** after the General Election 2013 contributed greatly to the strength of procedural democracy in Pakistan that was set in 2002 when the journey on consolidation of democracy resumed after the coup d'état of 1999. The Federal and Provincial Governments experienced an apparently seamless transfer of power in a democratic fashion that resulted in a change of political guard in the Presidency, the Federal Government, and the Provincial Governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

This development coincided with the **maturity shown by the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) in facilitating other parties to lead Governments** in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa rather than forming Governments itself. This was notwithstanding the fact that the PML-N had the highest number of seats in the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan along with a sizeable number, including members of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam – Fazl (JUI-F), in the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, formation of a coalition Government including nationalist parties (such as the Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami

Party (PMAP) and the National Party (NP)) in Balochistan, and by the PTI and the JI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa manifested respect of other parties' mandates on the PML-N's behalf. The party's central leadership subsequently also discouraged its Azad Jammu and Kashmir's chapter of moving a No-Confidence motion against Prime Minister Chaudhry Abdul Majeed of the Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP)¹, along with discouraging the members of the JUI-F in the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from moving a No-Confidence motion against the PTI-led Government of Chief Minister, Mr. Pervaiz Khattak, MPA.

The **smooth appointments of the heads of key State Institutions** such as the Supreme Court Chief Justices, Justice (now Retd.) Tasadduq Hussain Jillani, and Justice Nasir-ul-Mulk, the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Maj. (Retd.) Qamar Zaman Chaudhary through the constitutionally prescribed mechanism was also a positive development. However, delay in crucial appointments such as of the Chief Election Commissioner marred the Government's performance in this regard.

In a major boost for transparency, an essential

The supportive role played by the Opposition Parties to curb the momentum of the PTI and the PAT sit-ins served as a much-needed lifeline for the Government, and the current democratic setup

feature of a democratic setup, the Provincial Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab passed progressive **Right to Information laws**. Although according to various experts, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Right to Information Act 2013 and Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act 2013 meet international standards of right to information legislation, citizens' right of access to information held by public bodies will remain unfulfilled till the respective information commissions play their role in the proactive implementation of these laws.²

Although the overall state of **Local Government** elections in the country remained despondent, Balochistan achieved the distinction on January 28, 2015 of being the only province to have **completed its Local Government elections**. It was a measure of the Balochistan Government's leadership to the principle of devolution of power that despite political maneuverings, security threats, and legal challenges, the Government managed to hold elections to the third-tier of Government where people can address their issues and concerns through the Local Government. Although the completion of Balochistan's Local Government elections is a milestone in itself, the Balochistan Local Government (Amendment) Act of 2013 must be criticized for being limited in scope, deferential to the Provincial Government, and not devolving comprehensive financial, political and administrative powers (as required by Article 140-A of the Constitution) to the Local Government setup. It contains provisions giving arbitrary powers to the Provincial Government such as that of discretionary removal of elected Local Government representatives, arbitrary powers of inspection, and the ability of the Provincial Governments to exclude areas from the purview of the Acts. These deficiencies are also found in the Local Government laws for the other three provinces as well.³

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government seemed to be ready by the end of 2014 to hold Local Government election as well. According to the schedule announced by the ECP, Local Government polls for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were

1. For details, please see No confidence against PM: PML-N stops its AJK chapter from supporting move, Dawn, July 25, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1031689>
2. For details, please see Proactive role of Information Commissions urged, The News, July 06, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-260175-Proactive-role-of-information-commissions-urged>
3. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled Comparative Analysis: Local Government Laws 2013, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/LocalGovernmentLaws2013_ComparativeAnalysis.pdf.pdf
4. For details, please see ECP announces LB polls schedule; KP takes lead over Punjab, Sindh, The Express Tribune, February 06, 2015, which can be accessed at: <http://www.thenews.tribe.com/2015/02/06/ecp-announce-lb-polls-schedule-kp-takes-lead-over-punjab-sindh>

to be held in May 2015.⁴ Regrettably, the two bigger provinces, Punjab and Sindh, continued to resist holding Local Government polls on one pretext or the other despite repeated Supreme Court orders with the announced election schedule for Punjab's Local Government elections for November 2015 and Sindh's for March 2016.⁵

The **supportive role played by the Opposition Parties** to curb the momentum of the PTI and the PAT sit-ins served as a much-needed lifeline for the Government, and the current democratic setup. This support was manifested by the condemnation for the sit-ins issued by almost all the major political parties such as the PPPP, JUI-F, ANP, PMAP, NP, etc. during the Joint Session of the Parliament convened on September 02, 2014. The Session saw the Parliament stand united behind the elected Prime Minister and reaffirm their commitment to the continuation of democracy. Furthermore, an Opposition *Jirga* was also formed, consisting of members belonging to the PPPP, NP, PML and JI to act as mediators and resolve the differences between the PTI, PAT and the Government on the issue of electoral rigging, although their efforts did not bear any concrete results.

2014 also saw the **larger public's decision to stay away from attempts to topple the Government** through protests initiated by the PTI and the PAT. Although the same period also saw considerable turnouts at the sit-in at D-Chowk and the protest rallies organized by the PTI across Pakistan, Mr. Imran Khan's call for Civil Disobedience was not well-heeded by the general public.

Factors and Developments Weakening the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan

The first and foremost development that weakened democracy was the protests and the manner in which these were carried out by the PTI and the PAT against the incumbent Government of the PML-N. Both the parties launched protest marches on August 14, 2014 with the one coordinated by the PTI called **Azadi March** and one by the PAT known as the **Inquilab March**. The PTI's main claim was that massive rigging had taken place in the General

The first and foremost development that weakened democracy was the protests carried out by the PTI and the PAT against the incumbent Government of the PML-N

Election 2013 across the country whose main beneficiary had been the parties of the 'status quo' including the PML-N, the PPPP, etc.⁶ The PTI in this regard also introduced a six-point agenda or objectives of the March that included the following:

- i. Resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
- ii. Re-election to all the Provincial and National Assemblies after their dissolution
- iii. Introduction of electoral reforms
- iv. Bringing an impartial caretaker setup with the consensus of all the political parties and stakeholders
- v. Resignation of all the members of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)
- vi. Hold those accountable who were involved in the alleged rigging of General Election 2013 under Article 6 of the Constitution

Later, Mr. Imran Khan was to withdraw his demand for the Prime Minister's resignation and even the call for sit-ins that lasted from August 14, 2014 till December 17, 2014.

As soon as PTI announced its plans to march to Islamabad, Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri's political party, the PAT also announced a similar protest march with its aims including the revamping of Pakistan's political system, the removal of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's current Government, the introduction of social welfare reforms, and establishment of merit-based local governing bodies throughout the country. The backdrop of Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri's Long March was the **Model Town Incident** that took place in Lahore

5. For details, please see LG polls in Balochistan: A laudable achievement, Business Recorder, February 02, 2015, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.brecorder.com/editorials/0/1147886:lg-polls-in-balochistan-a-laudable-achievement>

6. For details, please see PTI, PAT protests: Will there be a people's Parliament? Dawn, August 19, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1126316>

on June 17, 2014. This saw violent clashes between the Punjab Police and the PAT activists resulting in several protesters being killed by the police gunfire. The standoff lasted for almost 11 hours when the police's anti-encroachment squad launched an operation to remove the barriers from the road leading to the offices of Minhaj-ul-Quran and the residence of PAT founder Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri in Model Town, Lahore.

Tensions peaked with regards to the protesting parties' sit-in with the protests allegedly turning deadly with the police cracking down on the protestors on August 31, 2014 as they marched towards the Red Zone containing important State buildings such as the Parliament.⁷

During the months of August and September 2014, there were serious doubts regarding the continuity of the current Government. However, the sit-ins fizzled out as Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri announced his decision to end the Islamabad protest on October 21, 2014 along with indicating the PAT's decision to join electoral politics and to take the protests to the rest of the country. Mr. Imran Khan also called a series of public rallies across the country in the month of December 2014 aimed at paralyzing the cities. However, he also called off his sit-in on December 16, 2014 in the light of the Peshawar Tragedy.⁸

Another factor that weakened democracy in Pakistan during the period under consideration included the **weak performance of the elected Government** that dented the credibility of democracy as a system that ensures good governance. The areas where the Government's performance was found to be lacking included electric power production and management, immunization of children and the rampant spread of the poliovirus, and the delay in formulation of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Furthermore, the PML-N also failed to speedily appoint the heads of key Government institutions

such as that of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, National Database and Registration Authority, Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Pakistan Council of Research and Water Resources, Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority, National Institute of Oceanography, National Trust Population Welfare, Council of Works and Housing Research and Science Foundation, etc.⁹ Particularly embarrassing was the delay in the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner, especially in the context of increasing aspersions cast by the PTI and the PAT over the legitimacy of General Election 2013. The post had been lying vacant for 16 months since the previous CEC, Justice (Retd.) Fakharuddin G. Ebrahim resigned after the General Election 2013 on July 31, 2013 to protest Supreme Court's alleged interference in the Commission's domain.¹⁰ During the period, the Supreme Court had given four deadlines to the Government to appoint the CEC, and Justice (Retd.) Sardar Raza Khan was appointed just as the last deadline was about to expire.

A severe **lack of progress on Local Government** elections in three provinces along

Another factor that weakened democracy in Pakistan during the period under consideration included the weak performance of the elected Government that dented the credibility of democracy as a system that ensures good governance

7. For details, please see Pakistan anti-government protest turn deadly, Al-Jazeera, September 01, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/08/pakistan-anti-government-protests-turn-deadly-2014831145733222260.html>
 8. On 16 December 2014, 9 gunmen conducted a terrorist attack on an Army Public School in the city of Peshawar. They entered the school and opened fire on school staff and children, killing 145 people, including 132 school children, ranging between eight and eighteen years of age. This was one of the deadliest terrorist attacks ever to occur in Pakistan that caused the civilian Government and the Military leadership to re-evaluate and further boost their counter-terrorism strategy in the form of the National Action Plan.
 9. For details, please see As it happened: Pakistan school attack, BBC News, December 16, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-asia-30491113>
 10. For details, please see Headless institutions: Govt. urges Supreme Court to revisit its ruling, The Express Tribune, September 20, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/764892/govt-asks-sc-to-revisit-order-for-appointments-of-top-offices>
- For details, please see CEC appointed after 16 months, Dawn, December 05, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1148899>

with Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) and FATA was also observed during the period as the Provincial Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh failed to comply with Article 140 of the Constitution.

The period under consideration also saw a **significant rise in militancy** across the country that led to the civilian administration, the Media, the elected representatives, and the Judiciary underperforming in an environment of fear. A perfect example of this was the formation of Military Courts in the aftermath of the Peshawar Tragedy, allegedly due to the weak conviction rates observed in terrorism related cases. According to the Punjab Prosecution Department's data, a large chunk of acquittals in terrorism related cases was observed due to witnesses withdrawing their statements recorded during investigation,¹¹ indicative of the intimidation that accompanies testifying in such cases. This development was also accompanied by the **continued lack of clarity on the extremists' narrative** by political parties and the public-divide on the issue with majority of the stakeholders propagating talks with extremist elements in the country for the greater part of 2014.

Another development that significantly dented the quality of democracy during the period was the **increasing civilian-military tensions** observed due to multiple reasons that primarily included the following:

- i. The Prime Minister's decision to initiate treason trial against President Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf.
- ii. The Prime Minister's policy to promote bilateral trade with India
- iii. The attack on Senior Journalist Mr. Hamid Mir and the divergent responses by the civilian and Military leadership to it.
- iv. The initial decision by the Government (and the major political parties) to pursue talks with the Taliban instead of taking action against them, in contradiction of the perceived desire of the Military leadership.
- v. Allegations leveled against the Military leadership for allegedly supporting the agitating PTI and the PAT against the Government.
- vi. Irresponsible statements by some of the

Prime Minister's invitation to the COAS at the height of the PTI-PAT protests to mediate or facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis was also a low water mark in the democratic ups and downs during the period

Federal Ministers which were perceived to be critical of the Military

A subsequent **Military ascendancy in foreign and security affairs** was observed, highlighted especially by the agreement to establish Military Courts, lack of progress on India relations, and the increased international profile of the COAS, Gen. Raheel Sharif, in comparison to the members of the elected Government, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Prime Minister's **invitation to the COAS at the height of the PTI-PAT protests to mediate or facilitate** a peaceful resolution of the crisis was also a low water mark in the democratic ups and downs during the period. The event marked a series of disappointing developments, with the Prime Minister giving the impression in his speech to the National Assembly on August 29, 2014 that he had not initiated the request, the ISPR's Press Release that made it categorically clear that the COAS was asked by the Government to play the facilitative role, the acceptance of the COAS' facilitative role by Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri and Mr. Imran Khan, etc. Although nothing concrete emerged from the facilitation, the development, in the context of democracy, should be criticized, for the Prime Minister should never have requested, the PTI and the PAT never accepted, and the COAS never played a facilitative role in what was essentially a political matter.¹²

11. For details, please see Low conviction rate report: Report seeks reforms in criminal justice system, Express Tribune, May 29, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/714690/low-conviction-rate-report-seeks-reforms-in-criminal-justice-system>

12. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly Civil – Military Relations for the month of August 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_August012014_August312014.pdf

The period under consideration also saw frequent **Media controversies** caused by its lack of editorial responsibility, the attack on Geo TV's Hamid Mir, and the inability of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and the Pakistan Broadcasters' Association (PBA) to develop stronger Media codes of conduct and enforcing existing standards and punish transgressors as manifested by the unfounded allegations made live on air first by Geo Television against the ISI chief and later by Mr. Mubashar Lucman of ARY Television against members of the Government and the Judiciary.

Lastly, even though the Government faced severe criticism in this regard by the PTI and the PAT, it still could **not finalise proposals for electoral reforms** as the Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms failed to present any recommendations even though the period for presenting its finding has expired.¹³

While making the vote powerful improves democracy, as with the General Election 2013, democracy also requires efforts to make the powerful subject to law. Although the former was observed during the General Election 2013, that according to various experts was better and improved than the previous electoral exercises in

the country, the latter could not be observed, leading to significant deterioration in the quality of democracy in Pakistan from June 2013 – December 2014.

Democracy Scores by PILDAT's Democracy Assessment Group

In view of the above, the scores by the Group on the **Overall Quality of Democracy** fell significantly (47.4% for June 2013 - July 2014 and 44.3% for August 2014 – December 2014) compared to the 2012 – 2013 score of 54%.

Apart from the indicator on the Overall Quality of Democracy, the Group also scores on the remaining 12 indicators of the Pakistan-specific Democracy Assessment Framework which include the following:

Although according to assessment of the DAG, the Overall Quality of Democracy had decreased by the end of the assessment period, the average of the scores of the twelve remaining dimensions showed a modest increase (45.7% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 44.2% August 2014 – December 2014) over 2012 - 2013 (41.3%). The indicators that scored the highest and the lowest for the DAG scores for 2012-2013, June 2013 - July 2014 and August 2014 – December 2014 are

Table 1: Indicators of the Pakistan-specific Democracy Assessment Framework

No.	Indicators
1.	Overall Quality of Democracy
2.	Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures
3.	Performance of National and Provincial Governments
4.	Performance of Unelected Executive and Bureaucracy
5.	Performance of Judiciary/Access to Justice
6.	Performance of Media
7.	Election and Performance of Local Governments
8.	Constitutional Framework
9.	Rule of Law
10.	Electoral Process and Management
11.	Performance of Political Parties <i>vis-à-vis</i> Democracy Within as well as Outside
12.	Civil Society (Labour Unions, NGO Groups, etc.)
13.	Human Rights

13. For details, please see Wither electoral reforms, Dawn, January 24, 2015, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1159028/whither-electoral-reforms>


given in Table 2. In contrast to the scores by the Group, a Public Opinion Poll by PILDAT in July 2014 gave positive approval ratings on the Overall Quality of Democracy (56%) while 67% saw democracy as the best system of governance. A comparison of the DAG scores for the Pakistan-specific Framework indicators and the corresponding Public Opinion Poll scores is given in Figure 1.

The remaining 12 indicators of the Pakistan-specific Framework fell into three broad categories according to their DAG scores for June 2013 – December 2014. The top category, whose average DAG scores ranged above 50% for June 2013 – December 2014, included three non-political State Institutions and one non-state Democratic Institution. The DAG assigned the highest scores (54.1% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 57% for August 2014 – December 2014) for

Table 2: Highest and Lowest Scoring Indicators for 2012 - 2013, June 2013 - July 2014 and August 2014 – December 2014

No.	Period of DAG Scores	Indicator with the Highest Score	Indicator with the Lowest Score
1.	2012- 2013	Constitutional Framework (55.2%)	Human Rights (25.8%)
2.	June 2013-July 2014	Constitutional Framework (54.1%)	Election and Performance of Local Governments (32.1%)
3.	August 2014 - December 2014	Constitutional Framework (57.2%)	Election and Performance of Local Governments (18.8%)

Figure 1: Comparison of the DAG and Public Opinion Poll Scores for Democracy Indicators



this period to **Constitutional Framework** compared with 55% for the 2012 – 2013 period. Events that likely affected these high scores included the first-ever civilian transition of power and the indictment of Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf for subverting the Constitution.

Performance of Judiciary/Access to Justice saw a large improvement (52.6% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 54.9% for August 2014 – December 2014) over the 2012 - 2013 score (43.5%). In comparison, the Judiciary obtained an approval rating of 49% on its effectiveness and 62% on trust in the public opinion survey.

Electoral Process and Management was rated at 50% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 53.9% for August 2014 – December 2014 by the DAG compared with the 2012 – 2013 score of 53.8%. In comparison, the public approval rating stood at 50% for trust in the ECP, a whopping 85% believed in the need for reforms in the ECP and 63% approved the quality of General Election 2013.

Civil Society received DAG scores of 47% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 56% for August 2014 – December 2014 compared with 2012 - 2013 score of 46.4%.

The second category, whose average DAG scores for June 2013 – December 2014 ranged between 40%-49%, mainly included non-Governmental and non-political State Democratic Institutions.

The **Performance of the Bureaucracy/ Unelected Executive** was rated just below 50% (49.5% and 48.3%) by the DAG for June 2013 – December 2014 that reflects a large improvement over the 2012 - 2013 score (36.9%). This may have been due the PML-N's heavy reliance on the Bureaucracy to implement its agenda of good governance. The June 2013 – December 2014 period also saw the Parliamentary Opposition and the Government agree on a consensus candidate for the post of Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), i.e. Major (Retd.) Qamar Zaman Chaudhary. Negatively, the Federal Government removed several key bureaucrats controversially such as Mr. Tariq Malik, the head of NADRA who was removed under suspicious circumstances. In contradiction to the DAG's improved scores, the public approval ratings

about the Bureaucracy remained negative at 36%.

The DAG scores (43.9% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 45.7% for August 2014 – December 2014) for **Performance of Political Parties** essentially remained unchanged from the 2012 - 2013 score (45.4%). This could reflect the fact that except for a couple, the other parties have nurtured little internal democracy, low transparency and exhibited an inability to work freely from the heavy influence of particular families and their close supporters. According to the Public Opinion scores, the highest approval rating for internal democracy within political parties was given to the PML-N at 55% with the lowest to the MQM at 18%. The PPP scored an approval rating of 43% for internal democracy, the PML of 26%, the PTI of 50%, the JUI-F of 23% and the JI of 34%. Interestingly, according to PILDAT's evaluation of the internal democracy within political parties, the JI and the PTI scored the highest, with the PML-N and the PPP scoring the lowest.¹⁴

Average DAG scores (42.8% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 53.1% for August 2014 – December 2014) for the **Performance of the Media** were similar to 2012 - 2013 scores (47.4%) although it gained scores significantly from August 2014 to December 2014. The Media was accused of casting unsubstantiated aspersions on State Institutions, showing disrespectful religious content, forever projecting grievance-syndrome and exhibiting

Except for a couple, the other parties have nurtured little internal democracy, low transparency and exhibited an inability to work freely from the heavy influence of particular families and their close supporters

14. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled Assessing Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan, which can be accessed at: <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/AssessingInternalDemocracyofMajorPoliticalPartiesofPakistan.pdf>

sensationalism and a lack of editorial accountability. The inability of the PEMRA to effectively handle these issues, partially due to political interference and stay orders issued by Courts highlighted the need for strengthening balanced codes of conduct for the Media. Furthermore, the Pakistan Broadcasters' Association (PBA) has not adopted a member code of conduct. Still, public ratings about the Media were positive nationally with independence of the Media obtaining 56%, trust in Electronic Media obtaining 64% and trust in Print Media obtaining 57% positive scores.

Human Rights enjoyed a large increase (42.1% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 42.6% for August 2014 – December 2014) in DAG scores over 2012 – 2013 score (25.8%). In comparison, public opinion about state of human rights was positive only for 40% respondents.

The DAG scores about **Rule of Law/Civilian Government Supremacy over the Military**, while below 50%, showed a large overall upward spike against 2012 - 2013 scores (40.7% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 33.9% for August 2014 – December 2014). A downward trend however was observed across the June 2013 – July 2014 and August 2014 – December 2014 periods. This maybe because civil-military relations became increasingly tense over the period, with the Military gradually gaining ascendancy. A major overhaul was initiated by restructuring the Defence Committee of the Cabinet first into Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) and later into the National Security Committee (NSC). However, a critical review and revision is needed about its decision-making role (rather than a consultative and facilitative one) and its membership of heads of Armed Forces (the Committee has equal number of civilian and uniformed personnel). Both of these aspects constitute an anomaly compared to other such forums globally. For example National Security Councils of the USA, UK and India are consultative forums and none has even a single uniformed person as full member. If the NSC has to have a decision-making role, it is critical that it should have a statutory basis in the form of an Act of Parliament. Currently, the NSC is formed through an Executive Order. Pakistan's first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was also presented in the National Assembly of Pakistan on February 26, 2014. In the Public Opinion Poll, democratic checks on the Military were rated positively only by 45% while only 19% saw Army Rule as the best form of governance.

The Performance of the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures experienced a modest fall in DAG scores for June 2013 – July 2014 (40.5%) in comparison to the 2012 – 2013 level (44.9%). However, the August 2014 – December 2014 DAG score (44.8%) was back to the 2012 – 2013 level for Parliament and Provincial Legislatures. The biggest falls for June 2013 – July 2014 was registered in the sub-questions about Legislatures' representativeness of national diversity. There was also a large fall in DAG perceptions about Legislative productivity. Public approval ratings about Assemblies were 48% for their effectiveness of and 60% for trust in them as State Institutions.

The Performance of the National and Provincial Governments/Cabinets received a large fall in DAG scores compared with 2012 – 2013 (34.5% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 38.3% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 44.9% for 2012 - 2013). There is a strong perception that all five Cabinets were not empowered and merely rubber-stamped decisions taken individually by Chief Executives or by smaller 'Kitchen Cabinets'. Cabinets failed to contribute substantially towards strengthening the democratic system, ensure coordination across different Government branches, and proactively work to improve the working of the Bureaucracy. Furthermore, the performance of the Government has also been found to be lacking as according to experts, it is seen to moving from one crisis to another. Compared to DAG scores, public approval ratings for the performance of the Governments also remained low at 38.3%.

Election and Performance of the Local Governments were rated as the worst dimension

Cabinets failed to contribute substantially towards strengthening the democratic system, ensure coordination across different Government branches, and proactively work to improve the working of the Bureaucracy

despite registering a modest improvement over the 2012 - 2013 score (22.7%) in comparison to the June 2013 - July 2014 score (32.1%) possibly due to the holding of elections in Balochistan but a subsequent worsening in the August 2014 – December 2014 score (18.8%) due to the subsequent impasse elsewhere.














A comparison of the trajectories of the DAG scores for the 13 indicators is given in the table below.

Overall, the average 2013-2014 DAG scores of around two-thirds (8) of the 13 categories improved over 2013-2014. The DAG assigned the lowest scores to **elected State Institutions**, but higher scores to **Constitutional**

Arrangements, Electoral Processes, and the Performance of the Judiciary, Media, and Civil Society.

Overall, Pakistan has made some progress on one of the prerequisites for graduation from transitional to stable democracies, i.e., non-interruption of the democratic progress and regular credible elections, and Military coup has become less likely. However, on the other prerequisite, i.e., the elimination of the Military's informal powers, the Military actually assumed increasing informal powers over this period. Thus, the biggest single challenge in the way of Pakistan's graduation from a transitional to stable democracy is **rethinking the Military's informal powers** and bringing them strictly

Table 3: Comparison and Trends of DAG Scores for Pakistan-specific Framework over 2012-2014

No.	Indicator	Percentage Score Assigned for 2012 - 2013	Percentage Score Assigned for 2013-14	Trend
1.	Overall Quality of Democracy	54	44.3	
2.	Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures	44.9	44.8	
3.	Performance of National and Provincial Governments	44.9	38.3	
4.	Performance of Unelected Executive/Bureaucracy	36.9	48.3	
5.	Performance of Judiciary/Access to Justice	43.5	54.9	
6.	Performance of Media	47.2	53.1	
7.	Election and Performance of Local Governments	22.7	18.8	
8.	Constitutional Framework	55.2	57.2	
9.	Rule of Law	29.4	33.9	
10.	Electoral Process and Management	53.8	53.9	
11.	Performance of Political Parties vis-à-vis Democracy Within as well Outside	45.4	45.7	
12.	Civil Society	46.4	56.7	
13.	Human Rights	25.8	42.6	

In case the National Security Committee of Pakistan has to retain a decision-making role, it is critical to provide a statutory basis for that in the form of an act of Parliament

within the fold of law and the Constitution despite the set-backs suffered during this period. This can be done through concerted support by the Judiciary, Media, Political Parties and the Civil Society to the Elected Institutions for this purpose.

PILDAT provides the following recommendations to improve the quality of Pakistani democracy:

- i. **Local Government** election must be held in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and functional Local Governments must be formed in all provinces. Furthermore, Parliament should also enact laws to hold Local Government elections in the FATA, Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) and Cantonments across the country, to provide Local Governments with Constitutional protection against arbitrary dissolutions and excessive political interference by the Provincial Governments and make it obligatory for provinces and the Election Commission of Pakistan to hold Local Government elections regularly.
- ii. **Cabinets** must play meaningful roles in developing policies and coordinating and enhancing the performance of Government Ministries and meet weekly based on the Rules of Business mandating at least weekly Cabinet meetings to undertake regular reviews of different Ministries and substantive discussions on important issues.
- iii. **Legislatures** must enhance their legislative outputs and make Committees more functional. They must monitor the Elected and Unelected Executives more effectively. Payment to members of Legislative Committees for their TAs, DAs and other

receivables should be more stringently **conditional** to their record of attendance in Committees and Assemblies, as the Rules already state. The attendance records both of the plenary sittings and committees should be made public on the Assembly websites immediately after each sitting. A PILDAT appeal for disclosure of attendance records accepted by the federal Ombudsman is lying pending with the President of Pakistan for the last many months. The President should decide in favour of greater transparency and better democracy, as has been done by the federal Ombudsman.

- iv. The **Prime Minister** should assert democratic civilian control on all state institutions including the Military, both in protocol and substance. Despite setbacks during this period, the oversight of security agencies by the democratic institutions must be enhanced gradually so that the main thrust of security and foreign policy lies with the relevant State Institutions. A critical review and revision of the **National Security Committee** is needed about its decision-making role (compared to a consultative or facilitative one) and its membership of heads of Armed Forces both of which are an anomaly compared to other such forums globally. The National Security Councils of the USA, UK and India have only a consultative or facilitative role and not a decision-making role. None of the security councils in these three countries have full membership of uniformed personnel. In case the National Security Committee of Pakistan has to retain a decision-making role, it is critical to provide a statutory basis for that in the form of an act of Parliament. The Committee should meet at least once a month and substantive security issues must be discussed and decided there, with the Prime Minister taking the final decisions. The role of the elected Federal Minister of Defence and appointed Defence Secretary must be properly established in meetings and communication between the Prime Minister and the Army chief. The tendency to communicate with the Army chief through unrelated officials, such as the Punjab Chief Minister Mr. Shahbaz Sharif, MPA, should be curbed.
- v. The Pakistan Broadcasters' Association must develop self-regulating codes of conduct that further the cause of responsible journalism and reduce the chances of overly restrictive regulations being imposed by the Government. The Government should

encourage the development of such self-regulating frameworks and provide effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation. The PEMRA's independence and effectiveness must be strengthened. Media owners must become more accountable. The ability of Courts to review PEMRA decisions must be streamlined to make PEMRA more effective. Further efforts should be made to strengthen media including counter measures to the efforts made to undermine the media through money and pressure.

- vi. **Legislation aimed at Civil Society** groups must not hamper their independence and effectiveness but must help them improve their programming.
- vii. There is a critical need to enhance **professionalism, autonomy and career security within the non-elected Executive**. Furthermore, long-vacant positions, e.g., heads of major Government corporations and autonomous departments, must be filled speedily, meritoriously and transparently and incumbents must be given tenure security.
- viii. Allegations about **rigging in General Election 2013** should be investigated and public confidence in elections enhanced. Major electoral reforms are required to ensure credible elections, including clear criteria for the appointments of Interim Governments and election officials; holding of census; fresh delimitation of constituencies; verification of electoral rolls; use of latest technology; clear rules for candidate eligibility; removing the pre-

qualification of a judicial background for the Chief Election Commissioner and members of the ECP; having multi-partisan consultation for the appointment of the Interim Government, the Chief Election Commissioner and the ECP members; overhauling the system of recruitment, promotions and on-the-job training for the ECP staff; taking additional measures to decide all petitions within four months, e.g., streamlining election procedures to reduce the number of petitions and increase easy availability of evidence needed to decide petitions; appointing polling staff from other regions to reduce local political pressure on them; and posting the statement of count prepared at each polling station at the ECP website as soon as it is received.^{15,16}

- ix. The effectiveness and efficiency of the **Judiciary** must be enhanced and the large legal backlog must be reduced, especially at the lowest tier of the Judiciary. In order to do so, the number of judges should be increased, especially in Punjab and Sindh. The feasibility must be checked of a move from a four-tiered system (Civil Courts, District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court) to a three-tiered system such as in the United States of America in order to develop a more efficient judicial system. The High Courts should take immediate steps to enhance the number of judges and fill the vacancies expeditiously in the subordinate Judiciary.
- x. There should be a more stringent implementation of relevant clauses of the Constitution for greater **protection of human rights**, and equal treatment of all citizens, especially through an early activation of the National Commission on Human Rights. The DAG also negatively viewed the type of Constitutional tempering observed in the 21st Constitutional Amendment establishing Military Courts. Furthermore, all Pakistanis should take ownership of the Constitution and protest any effort to tamper with it.
- xi. The marginalized areas of Pakistan including **FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir** should be extended the same democratic rights as the rest of the country without comprising Pakistan's international position.


The Pakistan Broadcasters' Association must develop self-regulating codes of conduct that further the cause of responsible journalism and reduce the chances of overly restrictive regulations being imposed by the Government

15. For details, please see A case for urgent poll reforms, Dawn, August 23, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1127146/a-case-for-urgent-poll-reforms>

16. For details, please see The way forward, Dawn, September 14, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1131590/the-way-forward>, Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, PILDAT

Chapter 1

Introduction and Methodology



Introduction and Methodology

The Quality of Democracy nationally depends on two criteria.

1. Firstly, civilian rulers must attain complete powers (with no formal oversight role for non-civilian institutions) through regular and credible elections.
2. Secondly, they must rule effectively and accountably. Countries meeting the first criterion only are called **electoral democracies** while those meeting both criteria are considered **mature or full democracies**.

Democracy has had a chequered history in Pakistan. Over the past sixty-seven years since 1947, Pakistan has barely attained even the lesser status of an electoral democracy for only twenty-six years (1947-1951; 1972-1977; 1988-1999; and 2008-2014) if one discounts the 1985-1988 and 2002-2007 periods since the 1985 and 2002 elections failed international standards badly and Military Presidents reigned in these periods with powers to dismiss elected Governments. Overall, Pakistan has experienced ten different governance regimes since the Independence compared to the stable democracies since Independence in India and Sri Lanka. While there are legitimate concerns about the quality of governance during the 2008-2014 period, Pakistan took greater strides towards consolidating democracy during this period as compared to the earlier ones. The period represented the first time in Pakistan that:

- i. Two elections seen as credible by international observers were held consecutively.
- ii. A civilian Government completed its term and handed over power smoothly to another political party in 2013 under a civilian-managed transition.
- iii. Significant progress was made in dividing power vertically and horizontally among different relatively independent Government institutions and geographical units.

PILDAT, a non-partisan Pakistani think-tank, has been undertaking regular assessments of the quality of democracy in Pakistan since 2002. PILDAT had earlier been using a democracy assessment framework developed by the Sweden-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDEA). In 2012, PILDAT developed a Pakistan-specific framework that better reflected the situation in Pakistan based on internal deliberations and feedback from external stakeholders. The IIDEA framework is now used to develop an international comparison with other countries using the same framework while the Pakistan-specific framework deals with indigenous parameters.

The 2012 framework focused on two main dimensions: **processes and performance** (of democracy) with multiple sub-dimensions included under both dimensions. During 2013-2014, PILDAT introduced a separate governance assessment exercise which focuses on the performance dimensions of the previous consolidated democracy framework. The governance exercise focuses on the quality of public services delivered by State Institutions while the democracy exercise focuses on the extent to which State and other democratic institutions are inclusive, participatory and accountable. Thus, the new democracy

While there are legitimate concerns about the quality of governance during the 2008-2014 period, Pakistan took greater strides towards consolidating democracy during this period as compared to the earlier ones

assessment framework now focuses only on “processes”.

This report provides the results of the assessment undertaken for the period from June 2013 to December 2014, i.e., the first one-and-a-half years of the 14th National Assembly, the four Provincial Assemblies and the newly-elected Governments emerging from the 2013 General Election. PILDAT assessed the quality of democracy along these dimensions by using three main tools:

- i A review by PILDAT of the main positive and negative events and trends related to the different dimensions of democracy during 2013-2014.
- ii Two ratings (out of 100) provided for the June 2013 – July 2014 and August 2014 – December 2014 periods by a Democracy Assessment Group (DAG) consisting of around 25 eminent Pakistanis drawn from different walks of life.
- iii A Public Opinion Survey based on a nationwide sample of 3065 people conducted in June 2014 which included five-point Likert-scale responses ranging from highly satisfied to highly dissatisfied to different questions related to different democracy dimensions.¹⁷

There are significant differences in many cases in the scores assigned by the DAG and public to the same democracy dimension. This likely happened since DAG experts may have focused more on the policies adopted during the report period by different Governments under different democracy dimensions while the general public possibly focused more on final outcomes on each democracy dimension. The report findings in Chapter 5 are mainly organized according to the DAG scores since PILDAT has had a longer record of undertaking DAG assessments than public surveys related to democracy assessments.


This Chapter provides a brief introduction to the Report and an overview of the methodology used by PILDAT for accessing the quality of Pakistani democracy. Chapter 2 discusses the main positive and negative events related to democracy in Pakistan during the past 18 months. Chapter 3 presents the findings of PILDAT's Democracy Assessments. Chapter 4

provides an overview of democratic transition and consolidation processes globally, to help place discussions about the quality of Pakistani democracy in a global analytical perspective while Chapter 5 provides final conclusions and recommendations.

17. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled Public Opinion on Quality of Democracy in Pakistan, First Year of Federal and Provincial Governments, June 2013 – December 2014. It can be accessed at: http://pildat.org/Publications/Publication/SDR/PublicOpiniononQualityofDemocracyinPakistan_ExecutiveSummary_PILDATReport_June2013ToMay2014.pdf

Chapter 2

Major Events Affecting the Quality of Democracy: June 2013 – December 2014



Major Events Affecting the Quality of Democracy: June 2013 – December 2014

This chapter discusses the major events that affected the quality of Pakistani democracy during 2013-2014. 2014 was an eventful year even given the usually tumultuous nature of Pakistani politics. Unlike the past years, e.g., 2011 and 2012, where external events such as the Pak-USA relationships left a heavy imprint on Pakistani politics and democracy, in 2013-2014 it was mainly domestic events that held ascendancy. Six sets of events were particularly salient:

- i. Smooth civilian transition after the 2013 General Election
- ii. Weak subsequent performance of elected Government Institutions
- iii. Electoral disputes
- iv. Civilian-Military relationship
- v. Media issues
- vi. Terrorism
- vii. Weak performance by the elected Government

Civilian Transition

The General Election 2013 led to the first ever-smooth power transition from one credibly elected civilian Government to another, under a democratically-elected President, through elections supervised by an Interim Government selected by both the outgoing Leader of the House and that of the Opposition in the 13th (previous) National Assembly of Pakistan. Similar processes led to establishing Provincial Caretaker Governments.

New Governments were sworn in during June 2013, with the PML-N forming Governments nationally and in Punjab, the PPP in Sindh, the PTI and JI in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the NP, PMAP, and PML-N in Balochistan. This division of power across many parties was seen as a positive development to ensure competition between the various political parties with regards

to performance of the Provincial Governments. The PML-N eschewed the urge to try to form its own Governments in KP and Balochistan. Mr. Nawaz Sharif reportedly discouraged his party members against engineering a No-Confidence Motion against the PPP-led Government in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequently, a new President was also elected smoothly in August 2013 to complete the civilian transition although there were some concerns about the process and suitability of the person selected by the PML-N. The Supreme Court Chief Justice and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also retired before the end of 2013, meaning that all four most powerful positions in Pakistan had new incumbents within six months.

However, the optimism generated by this smooth transition dissipated due to subsequent events. The Prime Minister also announced the initiation of High Treason case proceedings against Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf for the Emergency he imposed illegally on November 3, 2007, which was seen as an opportunity to discourage future misadventures by army generals.

Performance of Elected Institutions

The performance of elected institutions was disappointing, in particular that of the National Assembly. While the new National Assembly formed Standing Committees after nearly one

The Supreme Court Chief Justice and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) also retired before the end of 2013, meaning that all four most powerful positions in Pakistan had new incumbents within six months

and a half month rather than within the mandated thirty days of the Prime Minister's election,¹⁸ some of the Provincial Assemblies formed such committees after 7-10 months, with the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan having the dubious distinction of not forming any Standing Committees during the period. The Assembly was the sole legislature from 2008-2013 which failed to establish any Standing Committee. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif remained present

in the National Assembly for only 2% of the total sittings of the National Assembly.

Political observers felt that all five Cabinets were not empowered and merely rubber-stamped decisions taken individually by Chief Executives or by smaller 'Kitchen Cabinets'. Cabinets failed to ensure coordination across different Government departments or proactively work to improve the working of the Unelected Executive.

Table 4: Chronology of Major Events: June 2013 – December 2014

Date	Event
May 2013	General Election 2013 held with the PML-N emerging with simple majority in the National Assembly. The PTI complains that General Election 2013 was massively rigged but that it would join the Assemblies and wait for one year for rigging inquiry through the system.
June 2013	New National and Provincial Legislatures take oath and new Governments instituted; Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif allows the PTI and the JI, and the NP, PMAP to form Governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan respectively as a goodwill gesture. The PPPP and the PML-N form Governments in Sindh and Punjab respectively
June 2013	Prime Minister announces High Treason trial against Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, causing tensions with the Army
July 2013	Abbottabad Commission report leaked to media which calls for civilian Government's supremacy over Security Institutions
August 2013	New President elected; Federal Government establishes a Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) (later re-named as the National Security Committee) to replace the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC)
August 2013	Provincial Assemblies of Sindh and Punjab pass Local Government Acts
October 2013	Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa passes Local Government Act
November 2013	New Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed
November 2013	Election Tribunal deadline for disposing of election petitions passes with less than 50% petitions disposed
November 2013	New policy for regulation of NGOs receiving foreign contributions formulated
December 2013	New Supreme Court Chief Justice takes over; Balochistan holds first phase of Local Government elections
February 2014	National Internal Security Policy (NISP) presented which establishes a Joint Directorate under NACTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority) to coordinate all intelligence agencies including those the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI)

March 2014	National Assembly Defence Committee receives Briefing from the ISI; Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf finally indicted in Treason Case
April 2014	Mr. Hamid Mir, senior journalist of Geo Television, attacked in Karachi, leading to renewed tensions between Government and the Military over alleged accusations by the media outlet that DG ISI, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Zaheer-ul-Islam had coordinated the attack.
April 2014	Gen. Raheel Sharif, while responding to the concerns of soldiers on undue criticism of the Institution (including the criticism by Geo Television and the High Treason trial of Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf), states that ' <i>Pakistan Army upholds the sanctity of all institutions and will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride</i> '. ¹⁹
May 2014	Geo Television channel banned for defaming the ISI; ARY TV Channel banned for defaming the Judiciary
May 2014	The PTI threatens major agitation if its demands against rigging are not reviewed
May 2014	Prime Minister Sharif visits India on oath-taking of the Indian Premier Narendra Modi, allegedly leading to increased difference between the civilian Government and the leadership of the armed forces.
June 2014	Protection of Pakistan Act (2014) passed raising concerns about human rights issues.
June 2014	The Supreme Court orders the Federal Government to form a National Council of Minorities' Rights
June 2014	14 PAT workers killed in police firing in Model Town, Lahore
June 2014	Army launches major operations against Taliban in North Waziristan
August 2014	The PTI and the PAT launch march and sit-in in Red Zone Islamabad, leading to attacks on the Parliament House and the PTV Headquarters and raising the specter of Military intervention. Threat recedes as the Government and protesting parties launch direct negotiations. The PTI resigns from the National Assembly, Sindh and Punjab Assemblies though resignations are not accepted.
September 2014	Joint Session of the Parliament is called with all the major political parties rallying in support behind Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the elected Government; Protests led by the PTI and the PAT criticized for weakening the current democratic setup.
September 2014	Negotiations between the Government and the protesting parties drag on without result; the Government's Foreign and Security policies tilt towards Army priorities due to pressure imposed by the PTI/PAT sit-ins
September 2014	Chinese President visit cancelled due to the Islamabad sit-in; Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar's appointment as the new DG ISI discussed well before time and based on agreement between the Civil and Military leadership
October 2014	The PAT winds up its sit-in without achieving its main objectives and declares its decision to join electoral politics. Meanwhile, no conclusive resolution of the Model Town tragedy is seen.
November 2014	The PTI expands its agitation by holding large public meetings in major cities and launching wheel-jam strikes nationally
December 2014	Taliban attack kills 132 school children in an Army Public School in Peshawar.

19. For details, please see Army to uphold its dignity, says COAS, Dawn, April 08, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098443>

December 2014	The PTI ends sit-in in light of the Peshawar Tragedy; resumes negotiations with the Government on election rigging
December 2014	The Government in light of the Peshawar Tragedy calls an All Parties Conference; Mr. Imran Khan also attends it; a National Action Plan is formed after evolving consensus between the major political parties. Resultantly, the Government ends moratorium on death penalty and approves setting-up of Military Courts to try hard-core terrorists, leading to further ascendance of the Army in national affairs. Provincial Apex Committees formed for all four provinces as well through a notification issued by the ISPR; membership of the Committees to include the top leadership of the Provincial Governments and the Military.

Additionally, Balochistan is the only province so far to have held Local Government elections though the Local Governments are still not in place even there with elections to reserved seats only held on December 31, 2014. The other three provinces have not held Local Government elections yet even though Provincial Legislatures have already passed Local Government laws. No law has been passed yet by the National Assembly to institute Local Government in areas under Federal authority (ICT, the FATA, etc.). Although considerable pressure has been exerted on this issue by the Supreme Court, it did not result in any significant development during the period.

Electoral Disputes

2014 witnessed one of the most extensive political agitations in Pakistan's history launched together in August 2014 by the PTI and the PAT.

The PTI's agitation related to its demands for major electoral reforms and an independent inquiry into its allegations about major rigging in the General Election 2013, even though most international and national neutral election observers (e.g., EU and PILDAT²⁰) rated the 2013 General Election as largely credible despite many administrative weaknesses.

The PAT's agitation related to its desire to usher in a revolution in Pakistan to improve governance and its demands for justice for the 14 PAT workers killed in June 2014 by the Punjab Police in Lahore.

Immediately after the elections, the PTI had

expressed reservations about its fairness but decided to participate in the Assemblies and review the progress on its allegations of rigging in Election Tribunals for one year. The PTI alleged involvement in rigging by former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice (Retd.) Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Caretaker Setup in Punjab including Caretaker Chief Minister Mr. Najam Sethi, and negligence of their duties by the Returning Officers and the Judiciary. Its demands included voter thumbs impressions verification, recounts in 4 constituencies of the National Assembly, removal of the four members of the ECP, the complete audit of the General Election 2013 and sweeping electoral reforms.

On the anniversary of the General Election 2013 in May 2014, the PTI announced plans to launch large-scale agitation against the Government if its demands were not met soon. Meanwhile, the Election Tribunals had failed to dispose of all electoral petitions of the 2013 General Election during the mandated four months duration,^{21,22} as during previous elections in Pakistan too. Notably, most of PTI's election petitions got rejected by the Election Tribunals while the Supreme Court refused to intervene in election matters repeatedly given Constitutional clauses stating that election disputes should primarily be handled by Election Tribunals.

The PTI had fielded a total of 767 candidates for both the National and Provincial Assemblies seats for the 2013 Election.²³ However, only 58 petitions (by 7% of the total PTI candidates for National and Provincial Assembly seats in

20. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled Assessment of the Quality of General Election 2013, which can be accessed at: <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/AssessmentoftheQualityofGeneralElection2013.pdf>

21. For details, please see Test of tribunals, The News on Sunday, July 13 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: http://tns.thenews.com.pk/test-of-election-tribunals/#.U8jJq_mSySo

22. For details, please see Justice delayed: Tribunal yet to decide fate of 12 aspiring lawmakers, The Express Tribune, May 11 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/706789/justice-delayed-tribunals-yet-to-decide-fate-of-12-aspiring-lawmakers/>

23. For details, please see Imran Khan surprises all by putting up 767 candidates, The News, April 22, 2013, as accessed on December 23, 2014 at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-172704-Imran-Khan-surprises-all-by-putting-up-767-candidates>

***Civil-Military relations
became increasingly sour
over the period under
consideration due to
differences of opinion
between the civilian and
Military leadership on key
issues***

General Election 2013) were filed by losing PTI candidates challenging the veracity of elections results in the designated Constitutional Forum, i.e. the Election Tribunals. As of August 2014 when the PTI launched its agitation, 39 petitions (i.e. 70%) had been decided by the Election Tribunals, out of which none were in favour of the PTI.²⁴ Even if all the remaining 19 petitions had turned out in favour of PTI, it would not have significantly changed Assembly seat positions. Yet, the PTI decided to launch its agitation in the form of the *Azadi March* on August 14, 2014. Given the pressing demands by the PTI on electoral rigging investigations and electoral reforms, the Prime Minister initiated a combined Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms for the latter and wrote to the Supreme Court to form a Judicial Commission for the former. However, these steps failed to satisfy the PTI and it decided to launch a long march and subsequent sit-ins in Islamabad during August 2014 to press its demands.

The PAT, which had earlier held an unsuccessful sit-in in Islamabad in December 2012 too, also announced its plans to hold a long march (titled the *Inquilab March*) to Islamabad to usher in a revolution around the same time. Although the goals of both parties differed significantly, they coordinated their plans to increase pressure on the Government. Both parties reached Islamabad in mid-August together, though their numbers fell far short of the 'Million March' they had promised. They subsequently held an extended sit-in inside the sensitive Red Zone in Islamabad, which led to attacks on Pakistan Television

(PTV) and the Parliament building and raised the specter of a Military intervention. The Prime Minister requested the Army Chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, to facilitate dialogue between the Government and protestors although mutual accusations meant that this plan was scrapped. As the days passed, the rumors of army intervention receded and the Government and protesting parties started direct negotiations, though without success. The factors which helped in sustaining democracy during this period were the vocal expression of support for democracy by other opposition parties, especially during the Joint Session of the Parliament, and their effort to facilitate a dialogue between the opposing parties; the lack of support by the masses for the agitation and subsequent tolerance shown by the opposing parties after the initial violent confrontation.

The PAT subsequently wound up its sit-in during October 2014 and decided to join electoral politics as its sit-in had failed to have the desired effects, but the PTI persisted with its agitation and expanded it by holding well-attended public meetings in major cities, followed by wheel-jam strikes. The PTI ultimately wound up its protests after the December 16, 2014 carnage of 132 school children by the Taliban in Peshawar and resumed negotiations with the Government. However, by the end of the year, there was not much progress in such negotiations due to inflexibility on critical issues from both sides related to the Terms of Reference for the Judicial Commission. Furthermore, the work of the Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms has languished, due to Government disinterest and PTI agitation.²⁵

Civil-Military Tensions

Civil-Military relations became increasingly sour over the period under consideration due to differences of opinion between the civilian and Military leadership on key issues.

The first bone of contention was the Government's decision to initiate High Treason proceedings against Gen. (Retd.) Musharraf for imposing the November 2007 emergency under Article 6 of the Constitution. This reportedly displeased senior military officials and army rank-and-file even though legal observers generally felt that the case against him is strong since the Emergency imposition was

24. For details, please see PTI allegations are far from facts, Daily Times, August 05, 2014 as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/05-Aug-2014/pti-rigging-allegations-are-far-from-facts>

25. For details, please see Wither electoral reforms, Dawn, January 24, 2015, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1159028/whither-electoral-reforms>

unconstitutional. Moreover it was felt that the case would serve to strengthen democracy by holding Military accountable for violating the Constitution.

The case, however, has languished subsequently in a Special Court due to repeated appeals filed by Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf's lawyers on various legal grounds such as the legality of the Special Court, the non-prosecution of abettors by the Government, etc.

The first public crack appeared in Civil-Military relations when Gen. Raheel Sharif issued a statement while responding to the concerns of soldiers on undue criticism of the institution saying that while “*the Pakistan Army upholds the sanctity of all institutions and will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride.*”²⁶ Observers believe that that the statement by the COAS was a response to the statements made by the ruling politicians, especially by the Federal Minister for Defence and Water and Power, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA and Federal Minister for Railways Khawaja Saad Rafique, MNA, on the Treason case.^{27,28}

The period also saw the leakage of the Abbottabad Commission Report (the Commission had been formed to take note of the American raid in Abbottabad to kill Mr. Osama bin Laden) that called for civilian supremacy over Security Institutions²⁹ - which also reportedly displeased the leadership of the armed forces.

The Government's decision to initiate peace talks with the Taliban in late 2013 also reportedly caused friction between the army high command which felt that the Government was dragging its feet on taking much needed action against the Taliban. Ironically, the ex-head of the ISPR subsequently issued a statement that the ex-

COAS Gen. (Retd.) Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had kept delaying the decision on such army action for three years. A major operation was ultimately launched in June 2014 after a major Taliban attack on Karachi airport.³⁰

The Government's desire to normalize relations with India saw Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif attending the swearing-in ceremony of Prime Minister Narendra Modi also allegedly further strained the relations between the Government and the armed forces as did the Government's perceived support of Geo Television in the wake of an attack on Hamid Mir, a prominent journalist, and subsequent accusations by Geo Television against the ISI for instigating the attack.³¹

The PTI-PAT agitation also increased tensions as the Government felt that the protests were coordinated by guidance by the Military. This agitation severely weakened the Government and allowed the Army to gain ascendancy on security and foreign issues, such as relations with India. Army ascendancy increased further after the December 2014 Peshawar carnage by the

The Government's decision to initiate peace talks with the Taliban in late 2013 also reportedly caused friction between the army high command which felt that the Government was dragging its feet on taking much needed action against the Taliban

26. For details, please see Army to uphold its dignity, says COAS, Dawn, April 08, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098443>
27. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly monitor on Civil-Military relations for the month of April 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitoronCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_April012014_April302014.pdf
28. For details, please see Strains already, Dawn, April 21, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1101227/strains-already>
29. For details, please see Leaked report shows Bin Laden's 'hidden life', Al-Jazeera, July 08, 2013, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/07/20137813412615531.html
30. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly monitor on Civil-Military relations for the months of June – July 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/Publication/CMR/MonitoronCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_June012014_July312014.pdf
31. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly monitor on Civil-Military relations for the month of April 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitoronCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_April012014_April302014.pdf

The independence of the Media has suffered a major setback and there was an imposition of ban for a limited time on Geo Television for defaming the Military and on ARY Television for defaming the Judiciary

Taliban, after which the Government and all the major political parties agreed to the formation of Military Courts for trying terrorists. It must be highlighted that on all issues of tensions between the Government and Military, all the decisions were within the Government's discretion. While one may not agree with all its decisions, it is difficult to argue that the Government exceeded its mandate, though the same could be argued against the Military.

Media Issues

From being accused of running a campaign against and casting unsubstantiated aspersions on State Institutions, to showing disrespectful religious content, the year has witnessed some key incidents that reflect the importance, and the lack of media responsibility.

The condemnable assassination attempt on Geo Television's senior journalist, Mr. Hamid Mir³² and the television network's consequent unsubstantiated accusations against the DG ISI, Lt. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam, further strained relations between the Government and the Military as the former was seen to be favouring Geo Television and the latter, the ISI.

The independence of the media has suffered a major setback and there was an imposition of ban for a limited time on Geo Television for defaming the Military and on ARY Television for defaming the Judiciary. The inability of PEMRA to effectively handle these issues, partially due to political and court interferences highlighted the

need for the development of balanced codes of conduct for the media. However, PEMRA and PBA have not been able to develop such codes, increasing chances of imposition of harsher restrictions by the Government.

Terrorism

The persistence of militancy in the country has led to the Civilian Administration, the Media, the Elected Representatives, and the Judiciary underperforming in an environment of fear. There is a continued lack of clarity on the extremists' narrative among politicians and the public remains divided on the issue. For example, there are people amongst even the political parties that dither on taking a concrete position regarding the extremists' activities. Furthermore, according to South Asian Terrorism Portal – SATP, the number of terrorism fatalities in Pakistan increased from 5379 in 2013 to 5496 in 2014 showing the dire threat the scourge consistently poses to Pakistan.³³ The culmination of this was seen in the Peshawar terrorist attack in December 2014 also led to a further tilt in powers towards the Military with the establishment of Military Courts after the approval of the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2015 and the Pakistan Army Act (Amendment) Bill, 2015.

Weak Performance by the Elected Government

The period under consideration also saw weak performance by the elected Federal and Provincial Governments on key areas of performance that has dented the credibility of democracy as a system that ensures good governance. For this, the Government's lack of performance in the following areas is particularly noteworthy:

- i. **Electric Power Production and Management**
Even though the Federal Government approved the National Power Policy 2013 designed to eliminate load shedding by 2018, circular debt of PKR 300 billion has been accumulated by 2014. Rampant load shedding still persists both in the urban and rural centers of the country.
- ii. **Immunization of Children**
Despite key steps taken by the Federal

32. Senior Journalist Hamid Mir hurt in Karachi attack, The News, April 20, 2014 <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-29824-Senior-journalist-Hamid-Mir-hurt-in-Karachi-attack>

33. For details, please see the South Asian Portal on Terrorism's profile on terrorist attacks within Pakistan, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: (<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.html>)

34. For details, please see the Global Polio Eradication Initiatives statistics on the number of polio cases in Pakistan, which can be accessed at: <http://www.polioeradication.org/Dataandmonitoring/Poliothisweek.aspx>

Government to address polio epidemic in Pakistan, the number of polio cases has increased by 179.65% (a total of 305 cases)³⁴ till 2014 (Total cases in 2013 were 110). Furthermore, 85% of the world's reported polio cases were from Pakistan in 2014.

iii. **Comprehensive and Effective Counter Terrorism Policy**

Although in light of the Peshawar incident, the civil and Military leadership of the country drew up a National Action Plan (NAP) as a counter terrorism policy, much dithering was observed by the Government on this issue. This included the delay in the activation of NACTA due to alleged budget constraints as stated by the Federal Minister for Interior, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan.³⁵

iv. **Appointments to Regulatory Bodies**


Although the Government made several important appointments during 2013 – 2014 including Chairman NAB, it has failed to appoint the heads of key Government institutions such as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, National Database and Registration Authority, Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Pakistan Council of Research and Water Resources, Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority, National Institute of Oceanography, National Trust Population Welfare, Council of Works and Housing Research and Science Foundation, etc.³⁶

35. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly monitor on the Civil Military relations in Pakistan for the month of October 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_Oct012014_Oct312014.pdf

36. For details, please see Headless institutions: Govt. urges Supreme Court to revisit its ruling, The Express Tribune, September 20, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/764892/govt-asks-sc-to-revisit-order-for-appointments-of-top-offices>

Chapter 3

Assessment of the Quality of Democracy



Assessment of the Quality of Democracy

This chapter provides an assessment of democracy and an overview of the major positive and negative trends that affected its quality during June 2013 – December 2014. The discussion is organized in descending order according to the scores assigned by DAG to the thirteen assessment dimensions as contained in the Pakistan-specific Framework.

Constitutional Framework

DAG assigned the highest score (54.1% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 57.2% for August 2014 – December 2014) to the Constitutional Framework dimension, which was one of only four dimensions (out of thirteen) to be rated above the 50% mark for June 2013 – December 2014. The average overall DAG score was almost unchanged from the 2012 – 2013 DAG score (55.2%). However, improvements can be seen compared to last year's DAG scores on the two related questions about how far the country's Constitution guarantees and protects a robust democratic order (64.2% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 64.3% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 60% for 2012 - 2013) and the extent to which its provisions are followed (47.4% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 43.2% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 44.4% for 2012 – 2013). Some of the events that likely affected

The main events during June 2013- December 2014 which could have caused this fall in scores on citizen rights and equality were several large-scale attacks on religious and sectarian minorities

these improved scores included the relatively smooth and first-ever civilian transition of power and the first ever indictment of Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf for subverting the Constitution.

Minor improvements were also seen in the average DAG scores for June 2013 – December 2014 about how far the Constitution guarantees equality of all citizens (54.7% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 67.4% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 60% for 2012 - 2013) and equitable treatment to all provinces and territories. The main events during June 2013 –

Table 5: Percentage DAG Scores: Constitutional Framework

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012-2013
Constitutional Framework DAG scores (Percentage)	57.2	54.1	55.2
How far does the country's Constitution guarantee and protect a robust democratic order?	64.3	64.2	60
How far does the Constitution guarantee equality of all citizens?	67.4	54.7	60
How far are the provisions of the Constitution followed in letter and spirit?	43.2	47.4	44.4
How far does the Constitution provide for an equitable treatment to all provinces and territories of the country?	58.4	54.7	56.3
How effectively does the Constitution guarantee individual rights?	52.6	49.5	53.1

December 2014 which could have caused this fall in scores on citizen rights and equality were several large-scale attacks on religious and sectarian minorities, particularly Christians in Peshawar and Shias in Balochistan, and the graphic murder of several women in public for exercising their rights to marry freely. On equitable treatment of all Provinces, the scores may have reflected inability of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) to take a decision on undertaking a population census. Furthermore, the Constitutional Status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remains compromised thus meaning that FATA people lack access to the judicial system prevalent across the rest of Pakistan.

Performance of Judiciary/Access to Justice

This dimension represents the second one to be scored above 50% by DAG for June 2013 – December 2014 and reflects a large improvement over 2012 - 2013 DAG score (52.6% and 54.9% vs. 43.5%). The large improvement likely reflected Justice (Retd.) Tassaduq Hussain Jilani's efforts to break away from the populist image of the Judiciary instilled by Justice (Retd.) Iftikhar Chaudhry and focus on efficiently reducing the Judiciary's case backlog. Thus, the Supreme Court's Human Cell Wing received 40,000 applications, out of which more than 27,000 complaints were disposed of during the tenure of Justice (Retd.) Tassaduq Hussain Jilani,³⁷ a record by the previous standards.

Furthermore, judicial activism continued during June 2013 – December 2014 as per the populist image of the Judiciary under Justice (Retd.) Iftikhar Chaudhry for taking *suo moto* notice of issues such as the General Sales Tax increase promulgated by the Government as soon as it took power in June 2013, the delay in holding

Local Government elections, the Missing Persons' case, etc. Other major *suo moto* cases also included that of the law and order situation in Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar, Taliban threats to Kalash people in Chitral and the status of the minorities.

The Judiciary was also credited for striving for a decrease in corruption in Pakistan through its continued focus and monitoring of official high-level corruption. Consequently, the DAG scores on all three sub-questions below reflect modest to large increases. At the height of the PTI and the PAT sit-ins in Islamabad, which raised rumours of a possible Military intervention to break the impasse between the Government and these parties, the Supreme Court also issued orders against the taking of any Extra-Constitutional steps by any quarter.³⁸ The Judiciary obtained an approval rating of 49% on its effectiveness and 62% on the public's trust in it as a State Institution in the public survey.

Electoral Process and Management

This dimension was the third one to be rated by DAG at or above the 50% mark though it overall witnessed a fall in the June 2013 – July 2014 score (50%) from 2012 - 2013 DAG score of 53.8%. This could possibly have been because of the concerted agitation launched by the PTI and the PAT against allegedly massive rigging in General Election 2013. However, the score for this indicator was restored to the 2012 – 2013 DAG levels for the August 2014 – December 2014 score. A possible reason for this may have been the fact that the PTI and PAT's claim of rigging remain largely unfounded, restoring the experts view in the country's electoral process and management.

May 2013 marked for the first time in Pakistani

Table 6: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of Judiciary/Access to Justice

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012- 2013
Performance of the Judiciary/Access to Justice DAG scores (Percentage)	54.9	52.6	43.5
How independent is the Judiciary?	69.6	64.2	51.3
How efficiently and economically does the Judiciary dispense justice?	46.1	46.3	35.6
How readily and completely are judiciary's judgments implemented?	49.1	47.4	43.8

37. For details, please see Chief Justice Jilani bows out this week, The Express Tribune, June 30 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/728986/chief-justice-jilani-bows-out-this-week/>

38. For details, please see SC orders state institutions against 'unconstitutional steps', Dawn, August 15, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1125478/sc-orders-state-institutions-against-unconstitutional-steps>

history that power was transferred democratically from one civilian Government to another through elections that were termed as credible and/or vastly improved over previous elections by neutral observers despite numerous administrative flaws.³⁹

The public approval rating was 50% for trust in the ECP, whereas a whopping 85% of the respondents thought that the institution required reforms. A positive development for Pakistan's democracy was the fact that 63% of the respondents of the public opinion poll approved

The sub-questions related to the independence and effectiveness of the ECP witnessed significant to large falls in June 2013-July 2014 compared to last year but upwards trends by August 2014-December 2014 as PTI's accusations remained unproven

the quality of General Election 2013. The sub-questions related to the independence and effectiveness of the ECP witnessed significant to large falls in June 2013 - July 2014 score compared to 2012 – 2013 but upwards trends in August 2014 – December 2014 score as PTI's accusations remained unproven. Furthermore, after the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) in July 2013,⁴⁰ the post was not filled permanently until Justice (Retd.) Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan was appointed as the Chief Election Commissioner in December 2014,⁴¹ that too after strong Supreme Court ultimatums. Three Supreme Court judges filled in as interim CEC in succession for 16 months.

Civil Society

Civil society received the next highest DAG score at 47% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 56.7% for August 2014 – December 2014 that represented a large increase from the 2012 – 2013 score (46.4%) both overall and for individual questions. Notably, development NGOs have played a major role in providing assistance to displaced people escaping violence following Military action against militants. Apart from relief efforts, the NGO's have also continued to highlight systemic deprivations in the provision of basic human rights such as the due process of law, education, health, etc.

Table 7: Percentage DAG Scores: Electoral Process and Management

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012-2013
Electoral Process and Management DAG scores (Percentage)	53.9	50.0	53.8
How far does the Constitution and laws provide for an independent and effective Election Commission?	64.1	55.8	63.8
How far is the ECP independent?	52.2	48.4	58.8
How far is the trust amongst the country's population regarding the credibility of the ECP?	40.5	45.3	57.5
How far is the ECP powerful, effective and able to enforce its writ?	51.7	46.3	51.3
How accurate and up-to-date are the electoral rolls?	56.6	56.8	54.4
To what extent do you believe was the General Election 2013 conducted in a transparent and fair manner?	58.3	47.4	

39. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled First 10 General Elections of Pakistan, August 2013, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Elections/First10GeneralElectionsofPakistan_August2013.pdf
 40. For details, please see Chief Election Commissioner Fakhruddin G Ebrahim resigns, Dawn, July 31, 2013, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1033217/chief-election-commissioner-fakhruddin-g-ebrahim-resigns>
 41. For details, please see Justice Sardar Raza Khan named CEC, Dawn, December 04, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1148760>

Pakistan also saw the Civil Society unite and come out in a strong condemnation of brazen attack on the Army Public School on December 16, 2014, demanding immediate action by the Government in firstly apprehending the culprits, and secondly in devising a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.

However, in November 2013, the Government approved a policy for regulation of organizations receiving foreign contributions. Under it, domestic and foreign organizations must register with the Economic Affairs Division of the Government before using foreign contributions and sign a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Government, which will stipulate, among other things, the work and geographical area of the organization. The policy has raised concerns among civil society since it may lead to excessive control over the civil society sector by the Government and slow down work.

Performance of the Bureaucracy/Unelected Executive

This dimension was rated just below 50% (at 49.5% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 48.3% for August 2014 – December 2014) by the DAG for June 2013 – December 2014 and reflects a large improvement over the 2012 – 2013 score of

36.9%. This may have reflected the initial emphasis that the PML-N Government laid on hiring the heads of major Government semi-autonomous institutions through a transparent process and an independent recruitment committee. However, little progress was actually made during the year on this laudable intent. The improvement in scores may also highlight the agenda of good governance that the PML-N had promised to implement, by the assistance of the country's Bureaucracy.

Additionally, the Government and the Opposition agreed on a consensus⁴² candidate to become the new chief of the country's main anti-corruption body, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Leader of Opposition, Khursheed Shah, decided to appoint Major (Retd.) Chaudhry Qamar Zaman as NAB Chairman. However, the decision was rejected by the PTI, the PML and the JI that questioned the credibility of the appointee and the negotiations between the PML-N and the PPPP in this regard. Public approval ratings about the effectiveness of the Bureaucracy, in contradiction to the DAG scores, remained dismally low at 36%.

Negatively, the Federal Government removed

Table 8: Percentage DAG Scores: Civil Society

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012- 2013
Civil Society DAG Scores (Percentage)	56.7	47.0	46.4
How far does the civil society represent the diversity of Pakistan?	57.8	48.4	51.3
How far does the civil society speak about the issues of the people of the country?	60.4	50.5	50.6
How effective is the civil society of Pakistan?	51.7	42.1	43.8

Table 9: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of Unelected Executive/Bureaucracy

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012- 2013
Performance of the Bureaucracy/Unelected Executive DAG scores (Percentage)	48.3	49.5	36.9
How far is the unelected Executive allowed to function free from partisan considerations in accordance with law, rule and regulation?	41.3	42.1	35
How much independence of the Executive is guaranteed through Constitution and laws?	51.3	56.8	43.3

42. For details, please see Consensus developed on NAB Chief, Dawn, October 9, 2013, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1048301>

several key bureaucrats controversially. For example, Mr. Tariq Malik, the head of NADRA, was removed under questionable circumstances while NADRA was involved in providing thumb verification reports for disputed election constituencies. In June 2013, Ms. Anita Turab⁴³ whose constant appeals to the Supreme Court led to the landmark judgment in 2012 against political appointments in the Bureaucracy, was served a dismissal notice by her senior officers. According to reports, this was due to her letter written to the Chief Election Commissioner highlighting the major reshuffle in the Bureaucracy by the PPPP Government before the 2013 Election.

Performance of the Political Parties vis-à-vis Democracy both Within as well as Outside

The June 2013-December 2014 scores (43.9% and 45.7%) for Political Parties essentially remained unchanged from 2012 – 2013 score (45.4%). However, there was significant deterioration in perceptions about the extent to which the Constitution guarantees the freedom of association and how far is that actually practiced for the June 2013 – July 2014 score. Overall, perceptions on these two sub-questions were still positive being near or above 50%.

The August 2014 – December 2014 scores were mostly back to their 2012 - 2013 levels. However, on the three questions related to the actual performance of the Political Parties, scores

The Federal Government removed several key bureaucrats controversially. For example, Mr. Tariq Malik, the head of NADRA, was removed under questionable circumstances

showed only modest changes from 2012 – 2013 and fared much lower than the first two questions. This could reflect the fact that except for a couple of parties like the PTI and the JI, the other parties have nurtured little internal democracy, low transparency about their fund-raising and expenditures and exhibited an inability to work freely from the heavy influence of particular families and their close supporters. A separate assessment during 2014 by PILDAT on internal democracy within eight major parties awarded the highest marks to the PTI (49%) and the lowest marks to the PML-N (32%).

Furthermore, the period also saw incidents showing that the central leaderships also lacked

Table 10: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of Political Parties

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012-2013
Performance of Political Parties DAG Scores (Percentage)	45.7	43.9	45.4
How far does the Constitution guarantee the freedom of association across the country?	62.1	54.7	65.6
How far is the freedom of association actually practiced in the country?	57.0	49.5	55
How democratic are the political parties internally?	28.4	32.6	35
How far are the political parties free from the influence of undeclared interest groups?	40.9	41.1	38.1
How organized are the political parties in general?	45.7	43.2	38.8
How far are the political parties financially viable to carry out their activities?	40.6	40.0	42.5

43. For details, please see Bureaucracy icon Anita Turab slapped with dismissal notice, The News, June 8 2013, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-23351-Bureaucracy-icon-Anita-Turab-slapped-with-dismissal-notice>

control over workers, leading to frequent instances of clashes between party workers, particularly between the PTI and the PML-N.⁴⁴ Additionally, 64% people gave positive ratings to their favorite Political Party possibly reflecting the close links between the electorate and parties, but only 44% to Political Parties in general.

Performance of Media

There was a significant fall in DAG scores (42.8%) for the Media for the June 2013 - July 2014 compared to the 2012 - 2013 score (47.4%) but a large upward swing to above 50% for the August 2014 - December 2014 score. Media performance came against scrutiny due to perceived Media responsibility in casting unsubstantiated aspersions on State Institutions and showing disrespectful religious content. As a result, the independence of the Media has suffered a major setback and there was an imposition of ban for a limited time on both Geo and ARY Television. The condemnable assassination attempt on Geo Television's Mr. Hamid Mir⁴⁵ further heightened stresses. The

incident also strained relations between the Government and the Military as the former was seen to be favouring Geo Television and the latter the ISI during the whole debacle. The inability of the PEMRA to effectively handle these issues, partially due to political interference, highlighted the need for developments of balanced codes of conduct for the media.

In a welcome development, an Anti-Terrorist Court convicted the culprits in the Wali Khan Babar case, the Geo Television reporter mercilessly murdered in Karachi in 2011. The trial is of importance because of the fact that the five main eyewitnesses to the crime were murdered by the accused in order to deter those pursuing justice. The sentencing of the accused by an Anti-Terrorist Court in March 2014 is definitely a step in the right direction. Public ratings about the Media were positive nationally with independence of Media obtaining 56%, trust in Electronic Media obtaining 64% and trust in Print Media obtaining 57% positive scores.

In a welcome development, an Anti-Terrorist Court convicted the culprits in the Wali Khan Babar case, the Geo Television reporter mercilessly murdered in Karachi in 2011

Human Rights

There was a large increase (42.1% for June 2013 - July 2014 and 42.6% for August 2014 - December 2014 vs. 25.8% for 2012 - 2013) in the DAG scores about the human rights situation in the country and modest to large improvements along all sub-questions except those related to the question of individual rights, perhaps reflecting the Supreme Court's extensive focus on the Missing Persons' issue.

In what appears to be a response to the Missing Persons' case and its handling by the superior Judiciary, the Government introduced a legislation titled the Protection of Pakistan Act

Table 11: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of Media

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012- 2013
Media DAG scores (Percentage)	53.1	42.8	47.2
To what extent do you believe media is independent of the influence of powerful interest groups within the country and outside?	45.2	43.2	42.5
To what extent do you believe does the country's population consider the print media's coverage of national issues to be trustworthy?	60.9	42.1	

44. For details, please see PILDAT publication titled Assessing Internal Democracy of Major Political Parties of Pakistan, which can be accessed at: <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/AssessingInternalDemocracyofMajorPoliticalPartiesofPakistan.pdf>

45. For details, please see Senior Journalist Hamid Mir hurt in Karachi attack, The News, April 20, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-29824-Senior-journalist-Hamid-Mir-hurt-in-Karachi-attack>

(2014) after various amendments. The law, which mainly authorizes civil and military Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to fire upon, arrest without warrant or enter and search without warrant any premises on forming a 'reasonable apprehension' against any person, preventive detention of up to 90 days and retrospective application of this, appears to have been prepared to protect the Civil and Military law enforcement agencies.

The law has been criticized by human rights organisations, though others have argued that it is essential that the balance between tough anti-terrorism legal regime and respect for human rights must be maintained by the Parliament, given the exceptional security circumstances prevalent in Pakistan.

Additionally, no conclusive resolution of the Model Town Incident has been seen and no action was taken based on the report compiled by Justice Baqir Ali Najfi on the incident.

Even though reportedly 55,000 people have been killed in terrorism related cases in Pakistan, till the Peshawar Tragedy, the Government had been dragging its feet on formation of a holistic counter terrorism strategy, leading to violation of fundamental rights such as protection of life and

property by the State.

An All Party Conference approved setting-up of Military Courts to try hard-core terrorists in the wake of December 2014 Peshawar incident in which the Taliban killed 132 school children. The establishment of Military Courts and the earlier lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty have been criticized since they will not provide due process to defendants and could lead to the hanging of innocent people.

Rule of Law (Civilian Supremacy)

The DAG scores about the rule of law, while below 50%, also showed a large upward spike for the June 2013 – July 2014 period against the 2012 – 2013 scores (40.7% vs. 29.4%) with the greatest increases appearing on the two questions related to the extent to which Pakistan's security agencies report to the civilian Government. However, they largely swung down to 2012 - 2013 levels by for the August 2014 – December 2014 scores as the Military became ascendant after the PTI/PAT protests and the Peshawar incident.

A major overhaul was initiated by restructuring the Defence Committee of the Cabinet into the National Security Committee (NSC). A new National Security Division of the Government of

Table 12: Percentage DAG Scores: Human Rights

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 -July 2014	2012- 2013
Human Rights DAG scores (Percentage)	42.6	42.1	25.8
How effective is the Government in protecting liberty of its citizens?	40.9	40.0	29.4
How effective is the Government in ensuring that the basic human rights of the citizens are not violated?	37.7	40.0	28.8
To what extent are the religious and ethnic minorities subject to equitable treatment by the Government?	35.3	37.9	28.1
How effective are the arrangements in protecting individual rights and addressing violations, if and when they occur?	36.1	33.7	40.6
How effectively does the Constitution guarantee individual (human) rights?	63.2	58.9	53.1

46. For details, please see PILDAT Citizens Report on Performance of Cabinet Committee on Defence: March 2012-March 2013 can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/PerformanceoftheDefenceCommitteeoftheCabinet_Mar2012toMar2013.pdf
47. For details, please see Reconstitution of NSC approved, The News, August 23, 2013, <http://images.thenews.com.pk/23-08-2013/ethenews/t-24938.htm>
48. For details, please see Third meeting of NSC, Prime Minister's Office, April 17, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: http://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_details.php?pr_id=438

Pakistan has been established with clear tasks to function as the Secretariat of the NSC.^{46,47,48} Although NSC members have met regularly since its formation informally, they have not done so regularly under the rubric of the NSC. This is counter-productive to institutional strengthening. A critical review and revision is needed about its decision-making role and its membership of heads of Armed Forces both of which are an anomaly compared to other such forums globally. This should include its decision-making role (rather than a consultative and facilitative one) and its membership of heads of Armed Forces (the Committee has equal number of civilian and uniformed personnel). This is not the case for the National Security Councils of the USA, UK and India are consultative forums and none has even a single uniformed person as full member. If the NSC has to have a decision-making role, it is critical that it should have a statutory basis in the form of an Act of Parliament. Currently, the NSC is formed through an Executive Order.

Pakistan's first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was also presented in the National Assembly of Pakistan on February 26, 2014. The NISP includes three elements:

1. Dialogue with all stakeholders
2. Isolation of terrorists from their support system
3. Deterrence enhancement by capacity building of the security apparatus to neutralise threats to internal security of Pakistan.

Contrary to the pledge made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the post of Army Chief will only be filled on the principle of seniority, Lt. Gen. Raheel Sharif, the 3rd in seniority then in the Army ranks, was appointed as the new Army Chief on November 28, 2013, ending months of speculation.

Additionally, upon the directives of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, an FIR has been registered against a Naib Subedar at the Malakand police station in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on behalf of the Federal Minister for Defence and Water and Power, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA, on the charge of forced disappearance of Mr. Yasin Shah, one of 35 internees from the Malakand internment centre.⁴⁹ In yet another development during the hearing of Balochistan's Missing Persons' case, the Supreme Court was informed that Army officials Major Saif and Major Moin, who were reportedly involved in illegal detention of missing persons, would be tried under the Pakistan Army Act.⁵⁰

As mentioned in the previous chapter, tensions persisted between civilian and Military leaders on peace talks and military action against militants, the Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf trial, relations with India, Missing Persons' cases, some criticism of the Military by the Federal Ministers, Media issues and other security-related issues culminating in the ascendancy of the Military after the PTI sit-ins which weakened the civilian Government and the December 2014 Peshawar which saw the formation of Military Courts. These have been criticized by civil society members since they symbolically and

Table 13: Percentage DAG Scores: Rule of Law

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 – July 2014	2012-2013
Rule of Law DAG scores	33.9	40.7	29.4
How far is the rule of law established in the country?	34.3	37.9	34.4
How far is the security sector effectively controlled by the elected Government?	34.8	34.7	29.4
How far are the intelligence agencies effectively controlled by the elected Government?	32.6	49.5	30

49. For details, please see PML-N offers hope in poll manifesto, The Nation, March 08, 2013, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/editors-picks/08-Mar-2013/pml-n-offers-hope-in-poll-manifesto>

50. For details, please see PILDAT's monthly monitor on Civil Military relations for the month of March 2014, which can be accessed at: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_March012014_March312014.pdf

***No conclusive resolution
of the Model Town
Incident has been seen
and no action was taken
based on the report
compiled by Justice Baqir
Ali Najfi on the incident***

substantively enhance the balance of power away from civilians towards the Military and undermine the civilian Judicial system. In the public opinion survey, democratic checks on the Military were rated positively only by 45% while only 19% saw Army Rule as the best form of governance.

Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

There was a modest fall in overall DAG scores assigned to the effectiveness of Legislatures for the June 2013 – July 2014 period compared with the 2012 – 2013 period (40.5% vs. 44.9%) but an upward trend back to 2012 - 2013 levels by August 2014 – December 2014. The National Parliament, apart from the Finance Act of 2013 and 2014, had till December 31, 2014 passed a total of 8 Acts including the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014. With regards to the quantity of legislation, the Provincial Assembly of Sindh ranked the highest with the passage of 36 Bills. However, a special mention must be made of the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which passed a strong law on Right to Information,⁵¹ the Ehtesab Commission Bill to prevent corruption,⁵² a Right to Public Services Ordinance 2013 to ensure the timely delivery of public services⁵³ and the Local Government Bill,

2013.⁵⁴ The Provincial Assembly of Punjab also passed a Right to Information and Transparency Act, 2013, Fair Representation of Women Bill, 2014⁵⁵ and the Local Government Bill, 2014.

Additionally, the 14th National Assembly became the second consecutive House in which the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly was elected as the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).⁵⁶ In another welcome development, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Honourable Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, MNA announced the introduction of a transparent and merit-based hiring process in the National Assembly Secretariat through the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). Furthermore, the Joint Session of the Parliament during the height of the PTI/PAT protests helped curb the momentum of the agitation. Regrettably, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif remained present in the National Assembly for only 2% of the total sittings of the National Assembly during the first Parliamentary Year.

The new National Assembly formed Standing Committees after nearly one and a half month rather than within the mandated thirty days of the election of the Leader of the House.⁵⁷ Worst still, the three Provincial Assemblies formed such committees after 7-10 months. The Provincial Assembly of Balochistan failed to form Assembly Committees for the full five years of the previous tenure (2008-2013) with the Standing Committees not formed till the completion of this report as well. Lack of serious effort has been evident in making Standing Committees functional, thus resulting in weak oversight of the Legislatures over the Executive. Public's Approval Ratings about performance of the Assemblies were 48% for effectiveness and 60% for trust.

A separate assessment by PILDAT in September 2014 ranked Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's Provincial Assembly as first and the Provincial Assembly of Punjab as the last based on analysis of ten different

51. Ibid.

52. For details, please see Roadmap to prosperity: a step towards greater transparency, the Express Tribune, August 31, 2013, details at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/597564/roadmap-to-prosperity-a-step-towards-greater-transparency/>

53. For details, please see Caught in the act: K-P to fight corruption with Ehtesab courts, The Express Tribune, February 6 2014, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/668032/caught-in-the-act-k-p-to-fight-corruption-with-ehetesab-courts>

54. Law for access to time bound public services launched, The News, December 27 2013

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-7-222738-Law-for-access-to-time-bound-public-services-launched>
Local Government bill sails through KP Assembly, Dawn, November 1 2013 <http://www.dawn.com/news/1053375>

55. First of its kind: Witness protection bill unanimously passed into law, The Express Tribune, September 18 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/606051/first-of-its-kind-witness-protection-bill-unanimously-passed-into-law/>

56. Khurshid Shah elected as PAC Chairman, Nation, December 11 2013

<http://www.nation.com.pk/islamabad/11-Dec-2013/khurshid-shah-elected-as-pac-chairman>

57. Rule 200, Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly of Pakistan

58. For details, please see PILDAT's Comparative Executive Summary on the Performance of the Provincial Assemblies, which can be accessed at: <http://www.pildat.org/eventsdel.asp?detid=716>

Table 14: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 -July 2014	2012- 2013
Parliament and Provincial Legislatures DAG scores (Percentage)	44.8	40.5	44.9
How effective do you believe have the National and Provincial Legislatures been with regards to their duty of Representing the people?	45.2	41.1	
How representative are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies of the country's population and its various segments (religions, provinces, ethnicities, economic groups etc.)?	45.7	43.2	58.1
How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in framing legislation to address national and provincial issues?	45.8	36.8	43.1
How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in exercising oversight of the Executive?	37.3	34.7	36.9
How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in providing a forum to diverse view points in the country / province for developing consensus?	46.1	44.2	45.6
How transparent and accessible are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies to citizens?	42.3	40.0	40.6
How far have the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies acted as entities independent of the Executive and contributed to the collective agenda?	38.8	37.9	
To what extent do you believe that Opposition and the Treasury benches have maintained a constructive relationship in both the National and Provincial legislatures?	57.0	46.3	

National and Provincial Governments/ Cabinets

Four different political parties headed the Provincial Governments after the General Election 2013, leading to pluralism and the possibility of healthy competition among them. There was a large fall in DAG scores about the performance of National and Provincial Governments compared with the 2012 – 2013 score (34.5% for June 2014 – July 2014 and 38.3% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 44.9% for 2012 - 2013). Their performance was rated as the second worst among all the thirteen dimensions for 2013 - 2014. There is a strong perception that all five Cabinets were not empowered and merely rubber-stamped decisions taken individually by Chief Executive or by smaller 'Kitchen Cabinets'. Cabinets are also generally seen as having failed to ensure coordination across different Government

Even though Pakistan is allegedly following a Parliamentary form of Government, the Prime Minister still exclusively exercises powers. Therefore, an Amendment should be made to the Rules of Business suggesting that decisions are implemented by a vote of the Cabinet

departments and proactively work to improve the working of the Unelected Executive.

Consequently, the worst score (16.8%) on any sub-question across the thirteen dimensions appears on the question below related to the extent of collective responsibility of the Federal Cabinet. Public approval overall ratings for Cabinets were at 38.3%. Public approval ratings for Provincial Cabinets on resolving issues were 48% for Punjab, 24% for Sindh, 53% for KP and 45% for Balochistan.

It must be noted that in a negative development for Pakistan's democracy, most of the decisions to be taken by the Cabinet are instead taken by the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers by relaxing the Rules of Business. This denotes a **Prime Ministerial form of democracy** instead of a **Parliamentary** one. According to accepted wisdom, Pakistan does not follow a Presidential form of Government because it leads to the concentration of powers in one hand. However, even though Pakistan is allegedly following a Parliamentary form of Government, the Prime Minister still exclusively exercises powers. Therefore, an Amendment should be made to the Rules of Business suggesting that decisions are implemented by a vote of the Cabinet such as in Israel.

Election and Performance of Local Governments

This dimension was rated as the worst among the thirteen dimensions. It registered a large improvement for the June 2013 – July 2014 over 2012 – 2013 DAG score (32.1% vs. 22.7%) but a

Table 15: Percentage DAG Scores: Performance of National and Provincial Governments/Cabinets

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 -July 2014	2012- 2013
National and Provincial Governments/Cabinets DAG scores (Percentage)	38.3	34.5	44.9
How strong is the concept of collective responsibility of the Federal Cabinet?	20.0	16.8	
How strong is the concept of collective responsibility in the Provincial Cabinets?	38.3	35.8	
To what extent do you believe that the Prime Minister has maintained a dedicated and constructive relationship with the Parliament?	33.9	30.5	
To what extent do you believe that the Chief Ministers have maintained dedicated and constructive relationship with the Provincial Assemblies?	40.9	37.9	

***The Provincial Governments
have shown a preference for
the Commissioner system,
whereby they manage Local
Government functions
directly through the
Bureaucracy***

sharp fall even below 2012 - 2013 levels for the August 2014 – December 2014 score. The major reason for this might be that Balochistan is the only province so far to have held Local Government elections despite the grave law and order situation in the province. The other three Provinces have not held Local Government Elections yet even though their Legislatures have passed Local Government laws. No law has been passed yet by the National Parliament to institute Local Governments in areas under Federal authority (ICT, FATA, etc.). Moreover, the Provincial Governments have shown a preference for the Commissioner system, whereby they manage Local Government functions directly through the Bureaucracy.⁵⁹ Considerable judicial pressure has been exerted

on this issue by the Supreme Court but in vein.

Overall Quality of Democracy

The score on the overall question about the Quality of Democracy in the country has witnessed a significant fall compared to the 2012 – 2013 levels (47.4% for June 2013 – July 2014 and 44.3% for August 2014 – December 2014 vs. 54% for 2012 – 2013). Thus, the overall score has fallen below the 50% mark. However, the average of the scores of the twelve remaining dimensions other than overall quality of democracy showed a modest increase (45.7% and 44.2%) over 2012 – 2013 scores (41.3%). Encouragingly, the majority of the public gave positive approval ratings on the overall Quality of Democracy (56%) while 67% saw democracy as the best system of governance. Overall, the average DAG scores of around two-thirds (8) of the 13 categories improved over last year. The year started on a highly positive note in the backdrop of the first-ever smooth civilian power transition. Despite some reservations expressed by several political parties about the fairness of the elections, all political parties joined the Legislatures. Expectations were also high since almost all major parties became part of the Government, nationally or provincially. Four different parties headed the provincial set-ups, leading to expectations of healthy competition.

However, by the end of the year, and especially by the time of the writing of this report, much of this optimism has dissipated and politics has taken an ugly turn unseen since the 1980s and

Table 16: Percentage DAG Scores : Election and Performance of Local Governments

	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 - July 2014	2012- 2013
Local Government DAG Scores (Percentage)	18.8	32.1	22.7
How far are representative Local Governments functional in the country?	16.5	27.4	19.3
To what extent do you believe is the political leadership in the country inclined towards facilitating the Local Government elections?	21.1	36.8	

Table 17: Percentage DAG Scores: Overall Quality of Democracy

Overall DAG scores	August 2014 – December 2014	June 2013 - July 2014	2012- 2013
How good is the quality of democracy in the country?	44.3	47.4	54.0
How effective are democratic institutions and how effectively are democratic processes followed?	45.2	44.2	44.5


59. For details, please see At the grassroots: Local bodies' elections — when and how, The Express Tribune, January 14, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/658708/at-the-grassroots-local-bodies-elections-when-and-how/>

1990s. A major factor leading to this dissipation has been the disappointing performance of the National and Provincial Governments on the governance factors mentioned above and in further strengthening democratic rule. Thus, little progress has been made in professionalizing the bureaucracy and increasing the efficiency of Government institutions. Legislatures, especially the National one, have not been highly productive in introducing new legislation. Cabinets and Parliamentary Committees have been ineffective.

While governance is now evaluated separately by PILDAT, the rather weak governance track record of all five Governments has further tarnished perceptions about democracy. Civilian and military relations have tilted in favor of the army since the launch of agitation by the PTI and the PAT and the December 2014 Taliban carnage of children in Peshawar. Finally, the PTI's increasingly vocal but often-unsubstantiated campaign about rigging during the 2013 General Election has furthered soured optimism about democratic consolidation in Pakistan.

Chapter 4

Democratic Transitions Globally



Democratic Transitions Globally

This chapter provides an overview of democratic transitions globally to serve as a comparison base for the evolution of Pakistani democracy. It discusses what the different types of fledgling democracies are and reviews the factors that strengthen national democratic systems. Finally, it undertakes a comparison of Pakistani democracy with other fledgling democracies to draw some conclusions about the likely trajectory of Pakistani democracy in the coming years.

People globally deeply desire good governance. Governance refers to the decision-making and delivery of public services, e.g., economic progress, security and utilities, by state institutions. Democracy most essentially refers to regimes where these state institutions are highly participatory, inclusive and accountable. The assumption is that the more inclusive, participatory and accountable state institutions are, the more likely they will deliver better governance to the vast majority of people. Thus, democracy is expected to produce better governance than non-representative alternative forms of governance such as dictatorships and monarchies. In practice, large numbers of countries fail to escape authoritarianism or even when they finally establish elected regimes, the quality of governance does not improve much, leading to cynicism about the value of democracy.

This report defines several stages in the move from unrepresentative to democratic regimes and the subsequent improvement in governance (adapted from Murtaza, 2011; Munck, 2003; Diamond, 1997; Schedler, 1998).⁶⁰

- **Authoritarianism** refers here to situations where credible national elections are not held at all.

People globally deeply desire good governance. Governance refers to the decision-making and delivery of public services, e.g., economic progress, security and utilities, by state institutions

- **Hybrid regimes** refer here to situations where elections of varying credibility are held but non-elected Institutions hold formal powers which undercut the powers of elected regimes.
- **Transitional democracies** are defined here as countries that have taken the first move away from authoritarian or hybrid regimes by holding 1-2 credible elections. Elected regimes assume full powers there with no formal substantive powers left with unrepresentative Monarchs or armies although such institutions often enjoy considerable powers informally.
- **Stable democracies** are defined here as countries that regularly hold credible elections and the civilian Government is not hobbled by the informal powers of non-elected state institutions and the quality of governance is gradually improving. Such countries are generally called **electoral or flawed democracies**, where democracy is accepted as the only game in town by all-powerful groups able to overthrow democracy.
- **Consolidated or mature democracies** are countries where the quality of governance improves substantially.

60. Pakistan's hide-and-seek with democracy, 1947-2011: The bridge to nowhere or creeping consolidation? Dr. Niaz Murtaza, South Asia Journal, 2011; Schedler, A., 1998, What is democratic consolidation?, *Journal of Democracy* 9, 2: 91-107; Munck, G, 2003, Democracy studies: Agendas, findings, challenges, in D. Berg-Schlosser, Democratization; the State of the Art, Germany: Barbara Budrich Publishers; Diamond, L., 1997, Introduction: In search of consolidation, in L. Diamond, M. Plattner, Y. Chu and H. Tien (eds), Consolidating the third wave democracies: Themes and perspectives, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Table 18: Types of Democratic Regimes and their Examples

No.	Types of Regimes	Examples
1.	Authoritarian (credible elections not held at all at the national level or even at all)	Middle-east monarchies; Central Asian dictatorships, China, Pakistan (1999-2002)
2.	Hybrid (elections held but non-elected institutions exercise formal powers)	Iran, Myanmar, Turkey (1990s), Chile (1990s) Pakistan (2002-2008)
3.	Transitional democracies (1-2 credible elections held; significant informal powers often exercised by unelected institutions; governance generally weak)	Pakistan, Tunisia, Thailand (2008-2013), Turkey (2000s)
4.	Stable democracies (credible elections held regularly; civilian Government fully empowered; governance improves gradually)	India, Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, most Latin American, Caribbean and Eastern European countries.
5.	Consolidated/full democracies (credible elections held regularly, civilian Government fully empowered and high- quality governance)	USA, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Scholars have identified four sets of factors that affect democratic progress (Guo, 1999; Haynes, 2001)⁶¹. These include:

- i. **Structural factors** that focus on the impact of macro-level societal structures, e.g., level of economic development, literacy levels, ethnic diversity and political inequality.
- ii. **Institutional factors** that focus on the balance of power among different societal institutions at any given time
- iii. **Strategic choice factors** that include the micro-level choices of powerful individuals based on self-interest
- iv. **Transient political-economy factors** that focus on recessions, wars and regional politics.

Pakistan ironically came into existence under an elected Government in 1947. Unfortunately, regular elections did not occur in Pakistan and in 1958 it experienced the first of its four Military takeovers. It has had democratic transitions in 1971, 1988 and 2008 though the army continued to exercise considerable informal powers throughout.

Since 1947, Pakistan has had ten different political regimes as shown in Table 19 compared with stable democracy in India and Sri Lanka. Since 2008, Pakistan has held two elections

termed credible by international and national observers, but the Army still wields considerable powers. **Thus, Pakistan can be considered a transitional democracy.**

Global democracy indices, such as the Freedom House and Economic Intelligence Unit ones, place Pakistan in the hybrid regimes category since their definitions and democracy categories differ from those adopted here. Thus, even though it started as a democracy and then subsequently had its first democratic transition several decades earlier than most developing countries, it is still not a stable democracy due to a confluence of all four factors above.

Mature democracies share certain key characteristics that include **high levels of economic development** reflected not only by high per capita incomes (which even many Middle-eastern authoritarian regimes also enjoy) but also high levels of literacy, industrialization and urbanization. Second, most them also possess very **low ethnic diversity and tensions**. All of these characteristics fall under the macro-level societal structures category, since once consolidated, the influence of the remaining three sets of factors on the quality of democracy becomes limited. All mature democracies graduated from being stable to full democracies over several decades and even centuries. Almost no country has gone straight from transitional to

61. Guo, S., 1999, Democratic transition: An overview, Issues and Studies, 35, 4: 133-148.; Haynes, J., 2001, Democracy in the developing countries, Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, Malden, MA: Blackwell Press.

Table 19: Different Types of Regimes and their Periods in Pakistan

No.	Period	Type of Regime in Pakistan
1.	1947-1951	Transitional democracy
2.	1951-1958	Bureaucratic autocracy
3.	1958-1971	Military autocracy
4.	1972-1977	Transitional democracy
5.	1977-1985	Military autocracy
6.	1985-1988	Hybrid regime
7.	1988-1999	Transitional democracy
8.	1999-2002	Military autocracy
9.	2002-2008	Hybrid regime
10.	2008-2015	Transitional democracy

full democracy in a short period since macro-level societal structures generally change slowly.

Thus, Pakistan must first move from being a transitional to a stable democracy before it can become a mature democracy. While macro-level societal structures act as overall background binding constraints there too, the most critical difference between transitional and stable democracies relates to the balance of power among societal institutions.

Among stable democracies, **India** is an obvious comparison base due to the shared history, culture and geography. Historical comparisons of the varying trajectories of democracy in Pakistan and India confirm the critical role of the differences in institutional balances of power. Thus, the Military and the Bureaucracy were much better well established in Pakistan at Partition but commitment to Constitutionalism made political parties much stronger in India (Jaffrelot, 2002).⁶² Strategic choice factors, which focus on the micro-level choices of powerful individuals, also played a role, with Nehru's longevity and his preference for democracy steering India towards democracy while the personal ambitions of key bureaucrats and generals pushed Pakistan towards dictatorship.

However, India has remained a stable democracy throughout even though socio-economic

indicators such as poverty levels did not indicate good governance and never had to deal with the struggles of ending authoritarianism or going from a transitional to stable democracy.

Thus, in analyzing how Pakistan can keep away from authoritarianism and move from transitional to stable democracy, countries like **Indonesia**, **Brazil** and **Turkey** provide useful lessons since they have all overcome long periods of authoritarianism through democratic transitions and then managed to become stable democracies.

Indonesia's example is particularly relevant since, like Pakistan, it is a Muslim country with a huge population, enormous ethnic diversity and nearly three decades of Army Rule which produced some economic development but also enormous ethnic tensions and violence, ending in the country's division. Indonesia experienced its first and only democratic transition in 1998, almost thirty years after Pakistan, yet it is a stable democracy today with five largely credible elections held since 1998 and its Military not enjoying much informal control. Like Pakistan, Indonesia also experienced terrorism but unlike Pakistan has successfully contained it.

Also, unlike Turkey and Malaysia, the two other Muslim countries with stable democracies and good economic development, its democracy has not resulted in the formation of personality cults

62. Jaffrelot, C., 2002, India and Pakistan: Interpreting the Divergence of Two Political Trajectories, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15, 2: 251-267.

Table 20: Democracy Assessment Dimensions and Public Opinion Scores

Democracy Assessment Dimensions in Descending Order by 2014 DAG Scores				
Dimensions	DAG scores (%)			Public Survey Ratings (%) June 2014
	June 2013- July 2014	August 2014 – December 2014	2012-2013	
Constitutional Framework	54.1	57.2	55.2	
Judiciary/Access to Justice	52.6	54.9	43.5	
i. Effectiveness of the Supreme Court				49
ii. Trust in courts				62
Electoral Process and Management	50.0	53.9	53.8	
i. Trust in the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)				50
ii. Reforms in the ECP				85
iii. Quality of General Election 2013				65
Unelected Executive/bureaucracy	49.5	48.3	36.9	36
Overall	47.4	45.7	54.0	56
Civil Society	47.0	56.7	46.4	
Political Parties	43.9	45.7	45.4	
i. Favourite Political Party				64
ii. Political Parties in General				44
Media	42.8	53.1	47.2	
i. Independence				56
ii. Trust in electronic media				64
iii. Trust in print media				57
Human rights	42.1	42.6	25.8	40
Rule of Law/civil-military issues	40.7	33.9	29.4	45
Parliament/Provincial Legislatures	40.5	44.8	44.9	48
National/Provincial Governments	34.5	38.3	44.9	43
i. Federal Cabinet's Performance				39
ii. Provincial Cabinets' Performance				42
Local Government	32.1	18.8	22.7	71

around towering leaders like Mr. Mohammed Mahathir and Mr. Recep Erdogan. Ironically, the three most economically industrialized Muslim countries are all stable democracies, thus disproving the often-touted incompatibility of Islam, democracy and development.

The experiences of all these countries reveals that the growing power of pro-democracy institutions like the Judiciary, Political Parties, Civil Society and the Media helped reduce the formal and informal powers of unelected institutions like the Army and the Bureaucracy⁶³ and led to the establishment of stable democracies.

These findings provide a useful context for predicting Pakistan's future democratic trajectory based on the data from the June 2013- December 2014 PILDAT Democracy Assessment. As shown above, out of the twelve substantive categories above other than the Overall Quality of Democracy category, the DAG scored four dimensions above the 50% mark, all of which constitute the non-elected components of state institutions or non-state institutions.

Encouragingly, Pakistan's Constitutional Framework is seen to be the strongest aspect of its democracy that can provide a strong foundation for the development of democratic rule within the country. The Judiciary and Access to Justice is seen to be the next strongest aspect. The emergence of a relatively independent electoral management process, despite its many flaws, was perceived to be the third strongest dimension. The average DAG scores for Civil Society for this period were also above 50%. Also, with the exception of the electoral process score that experienced only a modest decline, the other dimensions within this top category encouragingly all display some improvement over the DAG scores of last year. Falling in the middle and all scoring in the 40%-50% range were several non-elected state and non-state democratic institutions, including the Unelected Executive, Political Parties, and the Media. Such institutions play a major role in nurturing democratic values and monitoring the performance of and supporting formal and Governmental Democratic Institutions. The trajectory of these institutions over last year was mixed though, with Political Parties and the Media average DAG scores remaining

essentially unchanged and the score for the unelected executive improving.

Finally, at the bottom lie four dimensions with DAG scores below the 40% mark which constitute the elected political components of State Democratic Institutions in Pakistan. This category includes the rule of law (which in PILDAT's democracy framework largely focuses on the supremacy of the Government on security institutions), the five Governments and Legislatures and finally the largely non-existent Local Governments. That all these political State Institutions rank at the bottom is worrisome since they are the most visible and potent components of national democratic institutions and their performances provide the key to actual governance delivery. The trajectory over last year's performance is worryingly negative too for the two most important dimensions within this category, i.e., National and Provincial Governments and Legislatures.

While the DAG assessments are not rosy, they present certain encouraging signs that Pakistan could move from being a transitional to a stable democracy in the coming years.

- i. Firstly, Constitutional Arrangements, which provide the bedrock of democracy, and electoral processes, which ensure regular credible elections, are rated relatively higher.
- ii. Secondly, while Elected Institutions were ranked at the bottom, other institutions, such as the Judiciary, Media, and Civil Society, score relatively higher. In recent years, such

That all these political State Institutions rank at the bottom is worrisome since they are the most visible and potent components of national democratic institutions and their performances provide the key to actual governance delivery

63. Non-Western Roots of International Democracy Support, Thomas Carothers, Richard Youngs, Oliver Stuenkel, Claudio Fuentes, Niranjan Sahoo, I Ketut Putra Erawan, Maiko Ichihara, Tjiurimo Alfredo Hengari, Sook Jong Lee, Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Tsveta Petrove, June 3, 2014, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/non-western-roots-of-international-democracy-support>.

On one of the two prerequisites for graduation from transitional to stable democracies, i.e., non-interruption of the democratic progress and regular credible elections, Pakistan has made some progress as the chances of a military coup have reduced significantly

institutions have exerted increasing pressure on Elected Institutions to improve their performance, with some success. Such institutions played a far more successful role in checkmating constitutional digressions by Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf after the dismissal of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice (Retd.) Iftikhar Chaudhry and in weakening his overall hold on power. The growing powers of such institutions possibly also played a major role in thwarting a Military takeover at the peak of the PTI sit-in in Islamabad when rumors of such a takeover were rampant. Thus, the growing power of these institutions has significantly decreased the chances of a reintroduction of authoritarianism through a Military takeover or the regression to a hybrid system where the army is given a formal governance role, as is often suggested by retired Military Officials in Pakistan. Obviously, each of these pro-democracy institutions suffers from serious flaws of their own. However, democratic frameworks do not rest on the unrealistic assumption of idealistically driven governance alternatives, such as theocracy, technocracy and dictatorships, that a small group of highly honest and competent people only can lead imperfect developing countries towards progress in a short time. Rather, democracy is based on the more realistic assumption that mutual accountability and checks and balances among flawed institutions will help reduce the flaws of each one of them and lead to incremental national progress.

Thus, on one of the two prerequisites for


graduation from transitional to stable democracies, i.e., non-interruption of the democratic progress and regular credible elections, Pakistan has made some progress as the chances of a military coup have reduced significantly. Even the enormous pressure exerted by the PTI and PAT agitations did not derail democracy.

However, on the other prerequisite, i.e., the elimination of the informal powers of the Military, Pakistan actually suffered a reversal during this period, with the Military assuming increasing informal powers after the PTI/PAT agitations and the December 2014 Peshawar massacre. Evidently, the Military today may not be able to use its powers easily to re-impose authoritarianism or even attain formal legal powers to participate in national governance. However, it is still able to use its considerable soft, political and economic powers to retain a powerful covert role in governance.⁶⁴

As such, the biggest single challenge in the way of Pakistan's graduation from a transitional to stable democracy is the rethinking of the Military's informal powers despite the setbacks suffered during this period.

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Recommendations



Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter provides overall conclusions based on the detailed assessment of the quality of democracy during 2013-2014 conducted according to the thirteen dimensions of PILDAT's Pakistan-specific Democracy Assessment Framework. The chapter identifies the main areas of strengths and weaknesses within Pakistani democracy. It provides recommendations for overcoming the weaknesses and building further on the strengths emerging from the analysis provided in the last chapter.

The foremost conclusion is that the overall DAG score on the quality of democracy has fallen below 50% for this period despite credible elections and a smooth transition of civilian power in 2013. Therefore, the overall quality of democracy in Pakistan has substantially deteriorated. This reversal highlights the fact that democratic consolidation is not guaranteed to be a one-way, upward journey in countries like Pakistan.

The failure to build upon the strong mandates given by people to further consolidate democratic institutions and deliver on the governance front can quickly hamper and reverse gains made earlier as can the absence of strong institutions capable of dealing with the kinds of grievances raised by the PTI regarding electoral transparency.

However, public opinions on overall quality of democracy are still above 50%, meaning that more citizens scored overall quality positively than negatively nationally, while 67% saw democracy as the best system of governance.

There are differences in the scores assigned by the DAG and public to the same democracy dimension. DAG experts may have focused more on the Government policies adopted during the report period while the general public possibly focused more on final outcomes on each democracy dimension.

Therefore, the overall quality of democracy in Pakistan has substantially deteriorated. This reversal highlights the fact that democratic consolidation is not guaranteed to be a one-way, upward journey in countries like Pakistan

Overall, the DAG scores of around two-thirds (8) of the 13 categories improved. The DAG assigned the lowest scores to elected Government institutions. However **Constitutional Framework, Electoral Processes, the Judiciary, Media, and the Civil Society**, score relatively higher.

Pakistan can therefore be considered a transitional democracy, having escaped a hybrid regime in 2008. Overall, on one of the prerequisites for graduation from transitional to stable democracies, i.e., non-interruption of the democratic progress and regular credible elections, Pakistan has made some progress as military coup has become less likely.

However, on the other prerequisites, i.e., the elimination of the Military's informal powers, Pakistan suffered a reversal during this period as the Military assumed increasing informal powers. Thus, the biggest single challenge in the way of Pakistan's graduation from a transitional to a stable democracy is a rethinking of the army's informal powers despite the setbacks suffered during this period through concerted efforts by the Judiciary, Media, Political Parties, Civil Society and Elected Institutions for this purpose.

Given this overall situation, PILDAT provides

the following recommendations to enhance the quality of democracy in Pakistan in the future:

- i. Local Government elections must be held without delay in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and functional Local Governments formed in all Provinces. Parliament should also enact laws to hold Local Government elections in FATA, ICT and Cantonments. Article 140 of the Constitution needs strengthening since it only mandates formation of Local Governments and devolution of power to them. The National Legislature should provide Local Governments with constitutional protection against arbitrary dissolutions and excessive political interference by Provincial Governments and make it obligatory for the Provincial Governments and ECP to hold Local Government elections within 90 days of dissolution, as with Provincial and Federal Legislatures.
- ii. National and Provincial Cabinets must be empowered and must play meaningful roles in the development of policies and in coordinating and enhancing the performance of Government Ministries and subservient departments by meeting weekly as per the Rules of Business mandating at least weekly Cabinet meetings for regular reviews of different ministries/departments and substantive discussions on important issues.
- iii. National and Provincial Legislatures must enhance their legislative track-records and make Standing Committees more functional so that they may monitor relevant Governments departments and the Executive more effectively. Payment to members of the Standing Committees of the National and

The National Security Committee (NSC) should meet at least once a month if not more frequently and substantive security issues must be discussed and decided there, with the Prime Minister taking the final decisions

Provincial Legislatures regarding their conventional TAs, DAs and other receivables and privileges should be more stringently made conditional to their record of attendance in the functional Committees and Legislatures. The attendance records both of the plenary sittings and committees should be made public on the assembly websites immediately after each sitting. A PILDAT appeal for disclosure of attendance records accepted by the federal Ombudsman is lying pending with the President of Pakistan for the last many months. The President should decide in favour of greater transparency and better democracy, as has been done by the federal Ombudsman.

- iv. As the Head of a civilian Government that represents the supremacy of the civilian, political, elected and democratic fundamentals of the State of Pakistan, the Prime Minister should set the tone of oversight and of civilian command and control of the Military, both in protocol and substance. Substance-wise, despite major setbacks suffered during this year in the oversight of Security and Military agencies by the democratic setup, such oversight must be enhanced gradually to ensure that the main thrust of Security, Defence and Foreign policy lies with the relevant State Institutions. Furthermore, the National Security Committee (NSC) should meet at least once a month if not more frequently and substantive security issues must be discussed and decided there, with the Prime Minister taking the final decisions. Protocol-wise, the role of the elected Federal Minister of Defence and appointed Secretary, Ministry of Defence must be properly established in meetings and communication between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. The tendency to communicate with the Army chief through unrelated officials, such as the Punjab Chief Minister, Mr. Shahbaz Sharif, MPA, should be curbed and the civilian Government should take the risk to assert civil supremacy.
- v. Pakistan's NSC is a decision-making body as opposed to those in the USA, India, etc. It is not a consultative forum or a forum that helps in decision-making. Since this substantially, or partially, takes away the powers of the Cabinet, the Parliament should pass a law giving NSC the powers it has already assumed, including a part of the Prime Minister's powers. Furthermore, the composition of Pakistan's NSC is unique considering that uniformed people, i.e. the

Army leadership is not part of any such body in the USA, UK, India, etc. The National Security Councils of the USA, UK and India have only a consultative or facilitative role and not a decision-making role. None of the security councils in these three countries have full membership of uniformed personnel.

- vi. The Pakistan Broadcasters' Association (PBA) must develop self-regulating codes of conduct that further the cause of responsible journalism and reduce the chances of overly restrictive regulatory frameworks being imposed by the Government. The Government should encourage the development of such self-regulating frameworks and must provide effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation. PEMRA's independence and effectiveness must be strengthened. Media owners must become more accountable. The ability of courts to review PEMRA decisions must be streamlined to make PEMRA more effective. Further efforts should also be made to strengthen Media including counter measures to the efforts made to undermine the media through money and pressure.
- vii. Legislation aimed at civil society groups must not hamper their independence and effectiveness but must help them improve their programming.
- viii. There is a critical need to enhance professionalism, autonomy and career security within the Non-elected Executive. Furthermore, long-vacant positions, e.g., heads of major Government Institutions and autonomous departments, must be filled speedily, meritoriously and transparently and incumbents must be given tenure security.
- ix. Allegations about rigging or mismanagement during 2013 General Election should be thoroughly investigated at the highest level of the Judiciary so that public confidence in the electoral system could be enhanced. The DAG also felt that any opinions against the continuation of elected Government before 5 years through Unconstitutional means should be criticized and reprimanded.
- x. There is also a critical need to undertake major electoral reforms to ensure free and credible elections in the future, including

The Government should encourage the development of such self-regulating frameworks and must provide effective monitoring mechanisms to ensure their implementation

criteria for the appointments of Interim Governments and election officials, holding of census, fresh delimitation of constituencies, verification of electoral rolls, use of latest technology, clear rules for candidate eligibility and efficient handling of election petitions; removing the pre-qualification of a judicial background for the Chief Election Commissioner and members of the ECP; having multi-partisan (rather than bipartisan) consultation for the appointment of the Interim Government, Chief Election Commissioner and the ECP members; overhauling the system of recruitment, promotions and on-the-job training for ECP staff; taking additional measures to decide all petitions within four months, e.g., streamlining election procedures to reduce the number of petitions and increase easy availability of evidence needed to decide petitions; appointing polling staff from other districts or provinces to reduce local political pressure on them; and posting the statement of count prepared at each polling station at the ECP website as soon as it is received.^{65,66}

- xi. The effectiveness and efficiency of the Judiciary must be enhanced and the large legal backlog must be reduced, especially at the lowest tier of the Judiciary. In order to increase the efficiency of the extant judicial system, the number of judges should be increased, especially in Punjab and Sindh. An effort should be made to move from a four-tiered judicial system (which includes the Civil Courts, District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court) to a three-


65. For details, please see A case for urgent poll reforms, Dawn, August 23, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015 at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1127146/a-case-for-urgent-poll-reforms>

66. For details, please see The way forward, Dawn, September 13, 2014, as accessed on February 06, 2015: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1131590/the-way-forward>

tiered system such as in the United States of America in order to develop a more efficient judicial system.


- xii. The marginalized areas of Pakistan including FATA, Gilgit–Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir should be extended the same democratic rights as the rest of the country without comprising Pakistan's international position.

APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

Democracy Scorecard Based on the Pakistan-specific Framework



APPENDIX A

Democracy Scorecard Based on the Pakistan-specific Framework

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	Percentage Assigned by DAG for August 2014 – December 2014	Percentage Assigned by DAG for June 2013 – July 2014	Percentage Assigned by DAG for 2012 – 2013
	<i>How good is the quality of democracy in the country?</i>	44.3	47.4	54
	Processes <i>How effective are democratic institutions and how effectively are democratic processes followed?</i>	45.2	44.2	44.5
1).	Parliament and Provincial Legislatures	44.8	40.5	44.9
1a).	How effective do you believe have the National and Provincial Legislatures been with regards to their duty of Representing the people?	45.2	41.1	
1b).	How representative are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies of the country's population and its various segments (religions, provinces, ethnicities, economic groups etc.)?	45.7	43.2	58.1
1c).	How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in framing legislation to address national and provincial issues?	45.8	36.8	43.1
1d).	How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in exercising oversight of the Executive?	37.3	34.7	36.9
1e).	How effective are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies in providing a forum to diverse viewpoints in the country / province for debate and developing consensus?	46.1	44.2	45.6
1f).	How transparent and accessible are the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies to citizens?	42.3	40	40.6
1g).	How far have the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies acted as entities independent of the Executive and contributed to the collective agenda?	38.8	37.9	
1h).	To what extent do you believe that Opposition and the Treasury benches have maintained a constructive relationship in both the National and Provincial legislatures?	57.0	46.3	


2).	National and Provincial Governments	38.3	34.5	44.9
2a).	How strong is the concept of collective responsibility of the Federal Cabinet?	20.0	16.8	
2b).	How strong is the concept of collective responsibility in the Provincial Cabinets?	38.3	35.8	
2c).	To what extent do you believe that the Prime Minister has maintained a dedicated and constructive relationship with the Parliament?	33.9	30.5	
2d).	To what extent do you believe that the Chief Ministers have maintained dedicated and constructive relationship with the Provincial Assemblies?	40.9	37.9	
3.	Unelected Executive/Bureaucracy	48.3	49.5	36.9
3a).	How far is the unelected Executive allowed to function free from partisan considerations in accordance with law, rule and regulation?	41.3	42.1	35
3b).	How much independence of the Executive is guaranteed through Constitution and laws?	51.3	56.8	43.3
4).	Judiciary/Access to Justice	54.9	52.6	43.5
4a).	How independent is the Judiciary?	69.6	64.2	51.3
4b).	How efficiently and economically does the Judiciary dispense justice?	46.1	46.3	35.6
4c).	How readily and completely are judiciary's judgments implemented?	49.1	47.4	43.8
5).	Media	53.1	42.8	47.2
5a).	To what extent do you believe media is independent of the influence of powerful interest groups within the country and outside?	45.2	43.3	42.5
5b).	To what extent do you believe does the country's population consider the media's coverage of national issues to be trustworthy?	60.9	42.1	
6).	Local Government	18.8	32.1	22.7
6a).	How far are representative local governments functional in the country?	16.5	27.4	19.3
6b).	To what extent do you believe is the political leadership in the country inclined towards facilitating the Local Government elections?	21.1	36.8	
7).	Constitutional Framework	57.2	54.1	55.2
7a).	How far does the country's Constitution guarantee and protect a robust democratic order?	64.3	64.2	60
7b).	How far does the Constitution guarantee equality of all citizens?	67.4	54.7	60
7c).	How far are the provisions of the Constitution followed in letter and spirit?	43.2	47.4	44.4

7d).	How far does the Constitution provide for an equitable treatment to all provinces and territories of the country?	58.4	54.7	56.3
7e).	How effectively does the Constitution guarantee individual rights?	52.6	49.5	53.1
8).	Rule of Law	33.9	40.7	29.4
8a).	How far is the rule of law established in the country?	34.3	37.9	34.3
8b).	How far is the security sector effectively controlled by the elected Government?	34.8	34.7	29.4
8c).	How far are the intelligence agencies effectively controlled by the elected Government?	32.6	49.5	30
9).	Electoral Process and Management	53.9	50	53.8
9a).	How far does the Constitution and laws provide for an independent and effective Election Commission?	64.1	55.8	63.8
9b).	How far is the ECP independent?	52.2	48.4	58.8
9c).	How far is the trust amongst the country's population regarding the credibility of the ECP?	40.5	45.3	57.5
9d).	How far is the ECP powerful, effective and able to enforce its writ?	51.7	46.3	51.3
9e).	How accurate and up-to-date are the electoral rolls?	56.6	56.8	54.4
9f).	To what extent do you believe was the General Election 2013 conducted in a transparent and fair manner?	58.3	47.4	
10.	Political Parties	45.7	43.9	45.4
10a).	How far does the Constitution guarantee the freedom of association across the country?	62.1	54.7	65.6
10b).	How far is the freedom of association actually practiced in the country?	57.0	49.5	55
10c).	How democratic are the political parties internally?	28.4	32.6	35
10d).	How far are the political parties free from the influence of undeclared interest groups?	40.9	41.1	38.1
10e).	How organized are the political parties in general?	45.7	43.2	36.8
10f).	How far are the political parties financially viable to carry out their activities?	40.6	40	42.5
11).	Civil Society (Labour Unions, NGO Groups, etc.)	56.7	47	46.4
11a).	How far does the civil society represent the diversity of Pakistan?	57.8	48.4	51.3
11b).	How far does the civil society speak about the issues of the people of the country?	60.4	50.5	50.6
11c).	How effective is the civil society of Pakistan?	51.7	42.1	43.8

12).	Human Rights	42.6	42.1	25.8
12a).	How effective is the Government in protecting liberty of its citizens?	40.9	40	29.4
12b).	How effective is the Government in ensuring that the basic human rights of the citizens are not violated?	37.7	40	28.8
12c).	To what extent are the religious and ethnic minorities subject to equitable treatment by the Government?	35.3	37.9	28.1
12d).	How effective are the arrangements in protecting individual rights and addressing violations, if and when they occur?	36.1	33.7	40.6
12e).	How effectively does the Constitution guarantee individual (human) rights?	63.2	58.9	53.1

APPENDIX B

Democracy Scorecard Based on the IIDEA Framework



APPENDIX B

Democracy Scorecard Based on the IIDEA Framework

No.	Parameter and Sub-Area of Evaluation	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in January 2015	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in July 2014	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in Sep. 2013	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in 2012	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in 2011	Percentage Score Assigned by DAG in 2010	Percentage Score Assigned in pre-2008
1	Citizenship, Law and Rights	43	43	55	45	49	46	42
1.1	Nationhood and Citizenship	50.5	49	67	55	59	54	42
	<i>Overarching Question: Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination?</i>							
1.1.1	How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all who live within the territory?	42	44	46	49	57	51	43
1.1.2	How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are minorities and vulnerable social groups protected?	41	40	42	39	41	40	43
1.1.3	How much consensus is there on state boundaries and constitutional arrangements?	60	57.5	61	69	67	61	55
1.1.4	How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled?	50.5	45	47	51	59	56	41
1.1.5	How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the Constitution?	58	55.5	58	71	72	62	41
1.1.6	How far does the government respect its international obligations in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how free from arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy?	52	54	57	59	61	58	54
1.2	Rule of Law and Access to Justice	41	40	51	44	47	43	35
	<i>Overarching Question: Are state and society consistently subject to the law?</i>							
1.2.1	How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory?	36	37.5	39	36	43	33	33
1.2.2	To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and to transparent rules in the performance of their functions?	37	39	41	36	40	39	39

1.2.3	How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?	59	54.5	57	70	67	60	33
1.2.4	How equal and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration?	39	35	37	40	45	43	35
1.2.5	How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?	38	39	41	42	41	40	38
1.2.6	How much confidence do people have in the legal system to deliver fair and effective justice?	38	35.5	39	40	47	40	35
1.3	Civil and Political Rights	42	43	57	44	49	47	46
	<i>Overarching Question: Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all?</i>							
1.3.1	How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and from fear of it?	35	37	39	39	41	34	39
1.3.2	How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?	52	50.5	53	52	59	56	47
1.3.3	How secure is the freedom for all to practice their own religion, language or culture?	40	45	47	45	47	48	54
1.3.4	How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?	40	41	43	44	50	48	44
1.4.	Economic and Social Rights	38	38	47	38	40	40	40
	<i>Overarching Question: Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?</i>							
1.4.1	How far is access to work or social security available to all, without discrimination?	32	36.5	38	35	37	39	39
1.4.2	How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including adequate food, shelter and clean water?	33	33.5	35	31	35	31	39
1.4.3	To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all spheres and stages of life?	31	32.5	34	29	32	33	34
1.4.4	How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship?	39	36	38	35	40	41	40
1.4.5	How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their members' interests?	46	45	47	46	48	49	38

1.4.6	How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate governance, and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public interest?	44	46.5	49	49	50	48	44
2	Representative and Accountable Government	42	42	57	45	47	43	38
2.1	Free and Fair Elections	50	48	50	58	58	50	43
	<i>Overarching Question: Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?</i>							
2.1.1	How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?	56	52	55	58	54	51	39
2.1.2	How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration and voting procedures, how independent are they of government and party control, and how free from intimidation and abuse?	53	51	54	61	61	53	50
2.1.3	How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with the voters?	63	57.5	61	71	67	53	53
2.1.4	How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party system allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how closely do the composition of the legislature and the selection of the executive reflect the choices they make?	53	49	52	54	55	51	40
2.1.5	How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the electorate?	38	37.5	39	47	50	42	35
2.1.6	What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the election results accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?	35	38.5	41	54	53	50	40
2.2	The Democratic Role of Political Parties	47	46	67	52	52	51	41
	<i>Overarching Question: Does the party system assist the working of democracy?</i>							
2.2.1	How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and campaign for office?	58	56	59	71	66	63	47
2.2.2	How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office?	52	50	53	56	56	56	45
2.2.3	How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how far are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection?	37	36	38	40	40	59	36

2.2.4	How far does the system of party financing prevent the subordination of parties to special interests?	36	39	41	40	40	39	38
2.2.5	To what extent do parties cross ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions?	50	48	51	51	54	56	41
2.3	Effective and Responsive Government	38	38	53	40	39	38	39
	<i>Overarching Question: Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns?</i>							
2.3.1	How far is the elected government able to influence or control those matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is it informed, organized and resourced to do so?	38	42	44	47	41	36	40
2.3.2	How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies?	42	46	48	45	46	44	41
2.3.3	How open and systematic are the procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the access for relevant interests to government?	36	36	38	40	44	39	36
2.3.4	How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?	34	32.5	34	33	35	34	39
2.3.5	How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government information under the constitution or other laws?	45	39.5	42	45	40	43	39
2.3.6	How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?	30	32.5	34	30	29	31	38
2.4	The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament	47	48	63	52	52	50	40
	<i>Overarching Question: Does the Parliament or Legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process?</i>							
2.4.1	How independent is the Parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions?	46	51	54	59	53	54	38
2.4.2	How extensive and effective are the powers of the Parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation?	57	55	58	58	60	61	41

2.4.3	How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?	39	43.5	46	47	46	44	38
2.4.4	How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of taxation and public expenditure?	38	40	42	38	39	38	39
2.4.5	How freely are all parties and groups able to organize within the parliament or legislature and contribute to its work?	56	50.5	53	55	57	56	38
2.4.6	How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its work?	42	43.5	46	39	47	42	37
2.4.7	How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents?	57	55.5	58	58	61	60	47
2.4.8	How well does the parliament or legislature provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?	41	44.5	47	58	55	48	40
2.5	Civilian Control of the Military and Police	38	38	47	39	42	35	32
	<i>Overarching Question: Are the military and police forces under civilian control?</i>							
2.5.1	How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military involvement?	32	32.5	34	39	35	26	25
2.5.2	How publicly accountable are the police and security services for their activities?	35	35	37	40	37	33	29
2.5.3	How far does the composition of the army, police and security services reflect the social composition of society at large?	50	48	51	49	56	51	41
2.5.4	How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, warlordism and criminal mafias?	34	34.5	36	28	36	33	36
2.6	Integrity in Public Life	34	32	43	31	33	34	32
	<i>Overarching Question: Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured?</i>							
2.6.1	How effective is the separation of public office from the interests of office holders?	30	27	28	31	31	36	32
2.6.2	How effective are the arrangements for protecting office holders and the public from involvement in bribery?	32	32.5	34	29	32	33	31


2.6.3	How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates and elected representatives prevent their subordination to sectional interests?	36	35	37	35	36	36	33
2.6.4	How far is the influence of powerful corporations and business interests over public policy kept in check, and how free are they from involvement in corruption, including overseas?	41	38	40	35	39	37	35
2.6.5	How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption?	29	28	29	26	27	28	30
3	Civil Society and Popular Participation	47	44	55	48	53	53	43
3.1	The Media in a Democratic Society	47	46	58	55	56	58	47
	<i>Overarching Question: Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?</i>							
3.1.1	How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic is their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign governments or multinational companies?	53	48.5	51	63	56	56	53
3.1.2	How representative are the media of different opinions and how accessible are they to different sections of society?	49	51	54	65	62	67	52
3.1.3	How effective are the media and other independent bodies in investigating government and powerful corporations?	54	53	56	63	62	62	51
3.1.4	How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?	40	43	45	43	51	48	46
3.1.5	How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media?	37	32.5	34	40	49	52	40
3.2	Political Participation	50	46	57	49	55	52	43
	<i>Overarching Question: Is there full citizen participation in public life?</i>							
3.2.1	How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc., and how independent are they from government?	52	51.5	54	60	65	63	48
3.2.2	How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?	50	49	52	53	56	53	45
3.2.3	How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels?	48	43.5	46	44	54	49	45
3.2.4	How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented within it?	36	38	40	39	43	42	39

3.3	Decentralization	41	40	50	40	44	47	40
	<i>Overarching Question: Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate for the people affected?</i>							
3.3.1	How independent are the sub-central tiers of government from the centre, and how far do they have the powers and resources to carry out their responsibilities?	43	43	45	43	48	53	43
3.3.2	How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?	40	39.5	42	43	46	48	40
3.3.3	How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?	40	37	39	35	37	41	38
4	Democracy Beyond the State	43	41	50	47	51	43	37
4.1	External Influences on the Country's Democracy	40	39	42	43	49	40	34
	<i>Overarching Question: Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country's democracy?</i>							
4.1.1	How free is the country from external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or national interests?	37	39	41	42	52	35	32
4.1.2	How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to whose decisions it may be subject?	45	40.5	43	47	57	41	39
4.1.3	How far are the government's negotiating positions and subsequent commitments within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate?	37	36.5	38	41	39	32	32
4.2	The Country's Democratic Impact Abroad	46	44	59	50	53	45	40
	<i>Overarching Question: Do the country's international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy?</i>							
4.2.1	How consistent is the government in its support for, and protection of, human rights and democracy abroad?	41	38	40	50	51	42	38

4.2.2	How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally?	58	53	56	66	65	54	50
4.2.3	How extensive and consistent is the government's contribution to international development?	51	47.5	50	49	58	48	39
4.2.4	How far is the government's international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and public influence?	34	38.5	41	36	39	34	31
	Aggregate	43	42	54	46	49	45	40

APPENDIX C

List of Members of the Democracy Assessment Group (DAG)



APPENDIX C

List of Members of the Democracy Assessment Group (DAG) (Names from No. 1-21 are listed in alphabetical order by last name)

No.	Names
1.	Mr. Omar Khan Afridi Former Caretaker Minister; former Chief Secretary NWFP
2.	Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Senior Journalist
3.	Mr. Cyril Almeida Analyst; Assistant Editor, Dawn
4.	Dr. Huma Baqai Chairperson, Department of Social Sciences Institute of Business Administration (IBA)
5.	Senator Hasil Khan Bizenjo President, National Party
6.	Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani Chairman, Gallup Pakistan
7.	Justice (Retd.) Manzoor Gillani Former Chief Justice, Azad Jammu and Kashmir
8.	Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Moinuddin Haider Former Governor, Sindh; former Federal Minister for Interior
9.	Mr. Shahid Hamid Senior Advocate, Supreme Court; former Governor, Punjab; former Federal Caretaker Minister
10.	Dr. Parvez Hassan Senior Advocate, Supreme Court
11.	Mr. Javed Jabbar Former Senator; former Federal Minister for Information and Media Development
12.	Mr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra Secretary General, Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz
13.	Mr. Wazir Ahmed Jogezeai Former Deputy Speaker, National Assembly
14.	Mr. Riaz Khokhar Former Foreign Secretary
15.	Mr. Faisal Karim Kundi Former Deputy Speaker, National Assembly

16.	Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Senior Defence and Political Analyst
17.	Mr. Ghazi Salahuddin Senior Analyst
18.	Mr. Mujib-ur-Rehman Shami Editor in Chief, Daily Pakistan
19.	Mr. Illahi Bukhsh Soomro Former Speaker, National Assembly
20.	Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi Former Ambassador
21.	Mr. S. M. Zafar Former Senator; Senior Advocate, Supreme Court; Constitutional Expert
22.	Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob President, PILDAT
23.	Ms. Aasiya Riaz Joint Director, PILDAT



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