


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
**International Conference
Civil-Military Relations**

October 21-22, 2008
Hotel Avari, Lahore, Pakistan



**Military Autonomy
and the Prospects of
Democratic Consolidation
in Pakistan**

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MILITARY AUTONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS OF
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN PAKISTAN

PILDAT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
October 21-22, 2008

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Preface

Military Autonomy and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation in Pakistan is a paper presented by **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua**, Defence & Security Analyst, at the **PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations**: October 21-22, 2008, Lahore, Pakistan.

PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations was held from October 21-22, 2008, at Lahore, Pakistan. The objective of the Conference was to showcase international and regional experiences and best practices in improving civil-military relations. Experts on civil-military relations from India, Turkey, Indonesia & Europe were part of the conference to present case studies and best practices on how to maintain and manage civil-military relations within an established constitutional and legal framework and move towards democratic consolidation. Pakistani Experts and academics, representatives of political parties and a large number of young professionals and students also participated in the two-day conference to discuss and brainstorm issues affecting civil-military relations in Pakistan and to reiterate the parameters of exclusive domains, as well as the overlapping and shared areas, of the civil and the military in Pakistan as a way forward for the country.

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Profile of the Author

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Dr. Siddiqua has been a civil servant for 11 years during which she was asked to work as the Director of Naval Research with Pakistan Navy making her the first civilian and a woman to work at that position in Pakistan's defense establishment. She also worked as a Deputy Director in Audit Defence Services Lahore Cantt. She is also a Ford Fellow and was the 'Pakistan Scholar' at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at Washington, DC for 2004-05. Dr. Siddiqua is also an author, and her books include, *Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy* (Palgrave Press, 2001). Her recent book, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, was released in April 2007. She has also written commissioned papers on small arms and light weapons proliferation, problems of governance and India-Pakistan relations. Moreover, she has contributed to various international journals like the *Journal for Defence and Peace Economics*, *Jane's Defence Weekly* and the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*. On June 13, 2007, during her latest book launch at International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Siddiqua said that she is not a politician and hers is an academic piece of work. She went on to add that she used Pakistan as a case study. She believes that this book is not a political thriller, rather it carries a broader issue of civil-military relationship in Pakistan. She is a visiting scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, teaching political economy and history of Pakistan.

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The Never-Ending Game of Chess: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

The February 2008 elections in Pakistan pushed the country back to democratic rule making many believe that the political system is re-launched and that the military has withdrawn to the barracks. This claim is compounded with the assertion that given the nature of internal threat of terrorism the military will not return to control the country and so Pakistan will eventually emerge as a strong or strengthened democracy. Such views, however, fail to grapple with the structural fault lines of Pakistan's political system nor are these sensitive to the inherent institutional imbalance of the power political system that might not change the basic shape of civil military relations in years to come.

Has the Tide Turned?

A particular claim we get to hear these days is that the four present realities will change the tide as far as civil-military relations are concerned: new professional leadership of the military, changed international perception, and the war on terror that requires all forces joining hands. However, for these four realities to have any impact on civil-military relations in particular there has to be a correspondent change in, what was mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the country's power politics. This paper will aim to consider all these four aforementioned realities in the historical context of Pakistan's civil-military linkage.

Military – The Primary Actor

At this juncture, the situation appears quite promising. The military is proverbially back in the barracks, a political government is in place and there is cooperation between the military and civilian on fighting the war on terror. In fact, it is for the first time in the country's history that the military has agreed to give a presentation to the Parliamentarians on the war on terror. This is possibly driven by two factors that is the nature of threat to the state and professional leadership of the army. The popular perception is that the present army chief being a professional soldier, who is also keen to bring in other professional men on board his team,

will transform the military back to its professional role of providing security to the country. After taking over as the service chief, General Kiyani stated his intention of pulling the military back from politics. As a gesture he withdrew the serving military personnel from civilian duties. However, do such acts naturally transform the military?

The answer is in a negative for five reasons. First, this is not the first time that the military has gone back to the barracks. Twice before the military has withdrawn to its original duty. The first time was in 1971, and the second in 1988 (I would dispute the change in 1962 as return to democratic rule because the hub of political power during the 1960s was a military general, Ayub Khan. Theoretically, when retired military officers enter politics the connection with the armed forces remains strong. The fact, as mentioned by political scientist, Edward Feit, is that general-turned-politician retains his links with the military. Such military-politicians depend on the military institution both directly and indirectly and, thus, can be considered as soldiers).ⁱ

The democratic intervention of the 1970s and later the 1990s did not ensure a major shift in the military's thinking which considers itself as the guardian of not only the frontiers of the state but also its ideology and national integrity (I will come to this point later in this section of the paper). After 1988, there were four army chiefs who chose not to directly intervene in politics. Yet this did not stop General Pervez Musharraf from taking over. A Bonapartist general remains embedded in the institutional system and surfaces only when the time is right. This is not to suggest that certain generals plan in advance to take over. However, since Pakistani generals consider political intervention as part of their professional duty to secure the state, this creates space for Bonapartist to take advantage of situations for direct intervention. This phenomenon will not change unless there is a fundamental change in the military's mindset and a conscious redefinition of the organization's role.

Second, considering that General Kiyani is keen to keep his service out of politics and he plans to leave the command of the service at the end of his tenure, this is no guarantee that the future generals will feel the same way. Third, the military has traditionally transferred power only at the time

ⁱ Edward Feit, *The Armed Bureaucrats*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). P. 6.

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of a crisis and when it lost its legitimacy before the public means that power is shifted to the civilians without any substantive change in the mindset. The first time that the military transferred power in 1971 was in the wake of a crisis that led to the breakup of the country. The second time was when a large portion of the senior army leadership was lost in the mysterious air crash in 1988 and military rule was being questioned in the streets. More recently, power was shifted as a result of unrest amongst the people after the judicial crisis. The political shift is embedded in the larger problem of political legitimacy of both civilian and military leadership, a problem that still remains and will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Fourth, the military will continue to be a reality and a key player in power politics due to its growth as an autonomous entity. The present day Pakistan military is not accountable to any other institution or government authority, and follows its own organizational norms. The institution, in fact, defines national security and interests itself.

According to American scholar Stephen P. Cohen, who is known for his work on the Pakistan Army:

“There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three”ⁱⁱ

Another popular saying for the Pakistan Army, which explains Cohen's views further is that while most countries have an army, Pakistan's army has a country. This perception is applied on the Honduran armed forces as well. The military acquired these multiple roles mentioned in Cohen's citation due to its prominent role in national infrastructure building after 1947 and in protecting the state against a larger neighbour India with whom it has fought three-and-a-half wars and is considered the main threat to the country's integrity. The first war with the neighbouring state in 1947-48, established the primacy of the national security agenda. Then on, military security attained maximum priority resulting in the government allocating

about 70 per cent of the estimated budget in the first year for defence.ⁱⁱⁱ This budgetary allocation symbolized the prioritization of the state and national agenda. According to Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan's current ambassador to the US, as a result of the first war in 1946-47, “...Islamic Pakistan' was defining itself through the prism of resistance to 'Hindu India.’^{iv} The India threat had an immediate effect in making the military prominent versus all other domestic players. This development was accompanied by lax control of the management of the armed forces by the civilian leadership.

Subsequently, the military grew stronger versus civilian institutions which were comparatively weak due to the peculiar nature of politics (to be discussed in the following section). According to Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal, the military strengthened even further in the ensuing years after the country's independence due to building up of its infrastructure which is owed to assistance from external power, the US.^v The enhancement of the organizational strength was compounded with the problem of a tradition of autonomous decision-making inherited from the British. The British army chief, General Gracy had refused to adhere to Mohammad Ali Jinnah's orders to mobilize forces in assistance of the operation in Kashmir during the first war with India. This tradition, as we will notice, was replicated by subsequent generations of military generals. Moreover, the tradition of military as an autonomous entity continued even after the indigenisation of the officer cadre post-1951. In fact, some of the sources claim that the military was part of the clique that masterminded changes in the domestic political scene. For instance, Dr. Hafeez Akhtar, who was Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad's physician, claimed that the Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra was fired through a consensus decision-making between Ghulam Mohammad, Iskandar Mirza and Ayub Khan.^{vi}

Considering the relative weakness of the politicians, the military established its autonomy in all respects. The three noticeable dimensions are: organizational policymaking, political and economic. The military's bid at gaining autonomy in organizational decision-making was obvious even during the early years after independence. According

ii Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press). P. 105.

iii Abdurrahman Siddiqi, *The Military in Pakistan, Image and Reality*. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996). P. 70.

iv Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). P. 15.

v Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*. (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1991) pp. 63-64.

vi Interview with Dr Hafeez Akhtar (Islamabad: 12/10/2008).

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to Hamida Khuhro's biographical account of her father, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, who was a Muslim League leader in Sindh, General Ayub Khan was adamant to monopolize all matters pertaining to the armed forces. For instance, the general was not happy with the prime minister, Sir Feroz Khan Noon's decision to authorise the civilian minister of Industries and Supplies, to procure military equipment. Ayub Khan also wanted the prime minister to endorse his third extension as the army chief.^{vii} The political conflict between the political and military leadership finally ended in the first takeover by the army in 1958.

The armed forces have always maintained its autonomy in terms of national security and strategic policymaking. For instance, barring the civilian leadership of the 1970s, which was instrumental in establishing the nuclear programme, the civilian leadership does not play a critical role in this area. Similarly, the India and Afghanistan policies fall in the ambit of the armed forces. A manifestation of this perspective is that the GHQ is always more comfortable with military personnel playing a vital role in national security issues, especially when a civilian regime is in charge. The most recent example pertains to the selection of the National Security Advisor to the PM's office, a position created as a bridge between the civilian regime, GHQ and Washington. The new position is an anomaly as far as the country's administrative system is concerned because historically there is no provision for this. However, its creation indicates an effort at bridge building as well as maintaining the military's confidence in strategic decision-making.

The above-mentioned autonomy coincides with the growth of military's role in politics that it initially owed to the civilian bureaucracy, one of the other strong post-colonial institutions inherited at the time of independence. Pakistani political scientists Saeed Shafqat^{viii} and Mohammad Waseem hold the civil bureaucracy responsible for the relative weakness of civilian institutions and increase in military's influence. The military rode into prominence on the shoulders of the civil bureaucracy. The first military

coup in 1958 was a result of a political alignment between the civil and military bureaucracy. In any case, before the coup the real power lay with the executive identified with the higher bureaucracy.^{ix} The coup itself was a consequence of the battle between the political forces and the civil bureaucracy. In the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the executive or the bureaucracy can be understood as: "...a group of bearers of office authority [that]...reduces the political parties to the role of mere brokers, who manipulate public relations in their favour and thus function as a legitimacy factor."^x The power equation between the executive and the legislative during the early days of the country's independence was inherited from the British. The colonial power controlled India through strengthening the state bureaucracy.^{xi} This pattern persisted in the ensuing years and the civil-military bureaucracy developed an interest in controlling the state and its politics. In the words of Saeed Shafqat the Ayub-Mirza alliance was the civil bureaucracy's bid to forge a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the armed forces.^{xiii} The office of the Governor-General was abolished after the introduction of the first constitution in 1956 in which Mirza insisted on becoming a powerful President. To ensure his army friend's allegiance, Mirza twice gave Ayub Khan an extension as Commander-in-Chief, first in 1954 and later in 1958. These personal concessions, however, would prove exceedingly costly to the civilian leadership. In 1958, the military could no longer be treated as a junior partner and the superordinate-subordinate relationship was reversed.

The Army continued in power until it had to voluntarily withdraw in the wake of political unrest towards the end of the 1960s and later the civil war followed by a war with India which resulted in the breakup of the country. However, the power was transferred to a politician, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was considered closer to the GHQ's point of view.^{xiv} Ever since, the formula for forming partnership with selected group of politicians was followed. This was evident during Zia-ul-Haq's regime during the 1980s and later by Pervez Musharraf. The Army has never been out of power but uses the strategy of withdrawing to the

vii Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro A Life of Courage in Politics*. (Lahore, 1998). Pp. 439-440.

viii Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations*. (Boulder, 1997). P. 21.

ix Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994). P. 123.

x Hamza Alavi in Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. (Islamabad, 1994). P. 133.

xi *Ibid.*, Pp. 51-131.

xii Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations*. (Boulder, 1997). p. 9.

xiii Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*. (New York, 2005). P. 35.

xiv Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc: In side Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007). Pp. 77-82.

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backbenches and controlling politics from the rear seat until it finds the space to come to the front. A popular perception now is that the military would never return to power again due to its compromised reputation. However, a similar view was held prior to October 1999 when many believed that the military would not step in after earning a bad repute under Zia-ul-Haq. Considering that the structural flaws in Pakistan's politics namely its authoritarian nature remains, there is a probability that the army might exploit another weak moment in the future to return to power.

The military's autonomous nature is also characterised by its efforts at economic empire building the worth of which runs into billions of dollars. These financial assets are created and operated by what I define as the military fraternity which includes serving military, retired military and numerous civilians who are directly dependent on the military economy.^{xv} The organisation's decision-making autonomy is crucial in creating entitlements that benefit the above-mentioned fraternity. This military economy has grown on the basis of the organisation's political power. At this juncture, the economic, political and decision-making powers are inter-twined with one helping the other in boosting the military's autonomy. Although the argument is that the economic power is meant for welfare, it is, in fact, a symbol of the military's desire to remain and feel autonomous of, what are considered as, incompetent civilians.

Finally, what continues to bolster the military's role in politics is the role of the political class which will be discussed in the following section.

Politics of a Praetorian State

Pakistan's history of sixty years has always been a struggle between military and civilian authoritarianism. The reason for this endemic crisis, which often make people think of the country as a failed state, lies in the excessive power of the armed forces in a praetorian culture. This means that the military manages to create political space for itself through using the inherent weakness of the political class to agree

upon a neutral arbiter amongst the civilians. Under the circumstances, the military forcibly occupies the slot of a neutral arbiter and is accepted in this role by the political class which is inherently authoritarian in nature. This behaviour, which political analyst, Edward Feit, defines as the praetorian syndrome is found in other states as well that suffer from military dictatorships.^{xvi} Feit further elaborates this condition as emerging from a characteristic called 'amoral familism'.^{xvii} This concept refers to a system in which each group focuses on maximizing its own interests and forms temporary coalitions to further their respective interests. Such an approach is antithetical to institution building. Given the problem of the absence a neutral political arbiter compounded with the issue of self-interests, the major societal groups begin to view the military as a political referee^{xviii} which could negotiate between the various political forces and help the ruling parties in furthering their interests.

Pakistani political scientist Hamza Alavi further explained such collusion between various power groups in Pakistan. He described the weakness of Pakistan's political institutions as the crisis of an overdeveloped state. The term 'overdeveloped' refers to the relative institutional strength of the state bureaucracy versus political institutions which resulted in a never-ending political crisis in the country. In his Marxian context, the author describes the post-colonial state as an 'overdeveloped' structure operating on the principle of peripheral capitalism, a concept that recognizes the plurality of economically dominant groups whose rival interests and competing demands are mediated by the state which is composed of a strong civil-military bureaucracy and weaker political institutions.^{xix} Thus, the ultimate arbiter role can only be played by the stronger civil-military bureaucracy and not by democratic institutions. The state, as argued by Alavi, plays a central role in the interests of other groups which the author refers to as the three dominant classes: the landed-feudal, indigenous bourgeoisie, and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. These three groups constitute the ruling power bloc that competes in the framework of peripheral capitalism.^{xx} While some form of capitalist mode of

^{xvii} Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral basis of a Backward Society*. (New York: Free Press, 1958). P. 85.

^{xviii} Edward Feit, *The Armed Bureaucrats*. (Boston, 1973). Pp. 2-5.

^{xix} Hamza Alavi, "Class and State". In Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), *Pakistan The Roots of Dictatorship*. (London: Zed Press, 1983). Pp. 42-43.

^{xx} Hamza Alavi, "The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism". In Hamza Alavi and Teador Shanin (eds.), *Sociology of "Developing Societies"*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982). Pp. 172-191.

^{xxi} Hamza Alavi, "State and Class Under peripheral Capitalism". In In Hamza Alavi and Teador Shanin (eds.), *Sociology of "Developing Societies"*. (New York, 1982). Pp. 296-299.

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production and economic redistribution introduces itself in the form of post-colonial capital, the pre-capitalist system remains preserved.^{xxi} The military's stakes are intertwined with those of the three groups making it imperative for the military and other groups to protect each other's interests. Thus, the military's relevance for the country's politics is a result of the symbiotic relationship between military force and political power, especially of the ruling elite. The dependence of the dominant classes over the military does not allow the civilian institutions to penetrate the military as much as the military infiltrates civilian institutions. Therefore, if seen from the lens of Alavi's theoretical formulation, the political flaws of prominent leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for example, are not personality traits^{xxii} but pertain to structural behaviour determined by the norms of peripheral capitalism. Despite reference to socialist ideology, Bhutto could not afford to keep his politically left-leaning partners. This, as Alavi points out, was due to the 'pull' of his class interests rather than just a simple personality quirk.^{xxiii} Therefore, the inaptitude of the political leaders in dealing with the military which appears to be more like political naiveté or sheer innocence in Haqqani's work is actually a structural problem.^{xxiv} The relationship between the military and the three classes gains significance for all the concerned players due to the importance of the bureaucracy in this 'overdeveloped' state.

A ramification of this power structure is that over the years the military used its autonomy to launch itself as an equal of the other elite groups through evolving into an independent power group itself. This, of course, does not mean the entire military, but the institution as representative of the interests of the military elite. The organisation finally managed to establish itself as an independent power group or a class politically through the National Security Council in April 2004. This new decision-making structure allowed it a role on par with the political elite and reversed the traditional parliamentary system of the military being firmly subservient to the political class. For those like Pakistani politician, Mushahid Hussain Syed,^{xxv} who argued that the NSC was only meant to provide an advisory role like in Turkey and thus did not indicate an enhancement of

military's power, the counter argument is that it is almost impossible to restrict a praetorian military in an elite-dominated society to a limited role and ignore its recommendations merely as an advice. The armed forces involvement in any form of decision-making or giving them a formal role in administration at even a basic level is inviting the trouble of reducing the civilian capacity to monitor or punish the military for shirking from its role as an agent. In any case, the amendment in the 1961 Turkish Constitution carried out in 1982 institutionalized the NSC as the highest non-elected decision-making body of the state. In Turkey, one of the spin-offs of the institutionalizing of military power was an increase in military officer's political and economic strength.^{xxvi} Like in Pakistan, the Turkish military used its political power for drawing economic dividends.

These factors mentioned above make Pakistan's military a formidable political actor. In fact, it would not be far fetched to argue that at the time of a civilian regime the armed forces represent the other powerful pole in the country's politics. Pakistan's political system is fundamentally a bipolar system in which the military replaces civilians and visa versa whenever either loses political legitimacy. This also means that the military might surface again if the current regime fails to deliver. A popular perception is that the military will not strike again as long as the economic conditions are poor. Given the present economic conditions all over the world, such a perspective is important. However, it is also a fact that historically the military takes over in dire economic conditions. The country's financial conditions are cited as one of the reasons for the armed forces to move into politics. So, this argument does not hold. What might stop the military from taking over is the absence of support of the international community, especially the US, from giving a carte blanche to Pakistan's military from taking over, and right now it does not seem to be such a moment.

^{xxii} Saeed Shafiq lists personality or personality traits as an independent variable.

^{xxiii} Hamza Alavi, "Class and State". In Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds.), *Pakistan The Roots of Dictatorship*. (London, 1983). P.

^{xxiv} Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military*. (Washington, DC, 2005).

^{xxv} Mushahid Hussain, "All Parties Flirt with Pak Army." In *Times of India*, 28/09/90.

^{xxvi} Tim Jacoby, *Social Power and the Turkish State*. (London, 2004). Pp. 145-148.

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Civil-Military Relations – The External Angle

The military and the state's foreign alignment with the US is one of the critical factors in formulating the GHQ's perception regarding its political role. Given the country's historic dependence on the US for weapons, diplomatic, economic, and political support, Washington plays a significant role in Pakistan's politics. This importance might recede in the coming years, especially if the US loses its edge as a sole super power. However, such a development is not likely to happen in the next five years or so which means that Washington's opinion will continue to matter unless the partnership with the US incidentally exposes the chasm between the civilian regime and the military in Pakistan.

I would like to underscore the word incidental because of the significance of Pakistan's military for Washington. The neo-conservative agenda allows for a certain type of democracy with no compromise on the strategic significance of the armed forces. So, unless there is a huge push from inside the country (almost of the scale of the Iranian Revolution), the US would not completely withdraw its support from Pakistan's armed forces (the American role in guiding Islamabad's reaction to the lawyer's movement and the issue of the restoration of the judiciary is a case in point. Washington is more confident of the military and anyone representing the armed forces than a civilian regime). The ultimate objective of the US would be for Pakistan to have a semblance of democracy with the military playing a critical role. It is the armed forces of Pakistan which has traditionally assisted America in fulfilling the latter's strategic objectives and will continue to do so in the future.

The Civil-Military Relations Context of the War on Terror

The above argument is presented with a caveat that at this particular juncture there is a battle going on between the military and the current civilian regime for greater American attention and support. The civilian regime seems to present itself as a viable option to the military in terms of delivering results on the war on terror, fighting the war on American terms and roping in the rogue elements inside Pakistan which are seen as instrumental in strengthening the anti-US

elements. The bid to change the administrative structure of the ISI can be seen as an effort in this direction. However, there are two factors which are important in examining this part of the argument. First, since the US does not seem to have the resources to bail out Pakistan from the current financial crisis, this factor would undermine the position of the civilian regime versus the GHQ. The military has traditionally supported a change in government in the face of a crisis and mainly when it sought external help, particularly financial resources, by using a more legitimate civilian dispensation to present the case. This proposition goes hand in hand with another that the military regimes in Pakistan have always received most financial assistance from the US. However, the foreign financial assistance does not necessarily impact the larger domestic debate regarding political legitimacy since military governments, like civilian regimes, run out of legitimacy after an average period of 9-10 years. The end of the rule is when both political legitimacy and financial resources from abroad begin to dry up and a change follows almost soon after. However, the stability of this regime like the previous civilian governments will depend upon external help. Given the authoritarian nature of politics and preference for kleptocratic distribution of resources, the civilian regimes are often unable to fundamentally alter the economic policy and redistributive process to reduce external dependence. Also, the civilian regimes are always under greater pressure to provide immediate economic bailout to the public after it takes over. This is to win greater political credibility which unfortunately always costs in term of long-term economic management. This time is not going to be different either.

Second, the military's ascendancy to a prominent public image is likely to be determined by the war on terror. In fact, the management of the war and its internal image has begun to rebuild the military's tarnished image after the judicial crisis. The new army chief, General Kiyani used the organizational autonomy to take a position seemingly independent of the government. This pertains to his statement criticizing American incursions inside Pakistan's territory and the army's response of firing at American helicopters. Although there is no opinion poll available to test the hypothesis, the popular notion is that the military's stock has gone up in the eyes of the people, especially in Punjab and Pakhtunkhawa. An improved reputation is what might help the military in taking over control once it decides to do so. The Bonapartist in the GHQ must have the

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confidence of being able to take his organization and bulk of the nation together once the decision is taken to overthrow a military regime. If the American intervention continues and the civilian regime is seen as Washington's lackey, the military, which at this juncture appears quite demoralized, will eventually recalculate its political position. The question right now is how many years will the organization take to make a come back?

MILITARY AUTONOMY AND THE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN PAKISTAN

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Conclusion

The civil versus military control battle in Pakistan is far from over. Despite the change of regime there is hardly any shift in the underlying structural dynamics of the country's polity. The military remains powerful and autonomous and the civilian regime is still ridden with its own problems including the continuation of the client-patron system of politics. The later issue becomes critical in now allowing a shift, especially when seen in the light of other realities such as the overt and covert power of the armed forces. The military has a relatively sophisticated system of intelligence which it always uses to destabilize a political government. It has used its intelligence network to weaken civilian regimes in the past and is likely to do so again once it considers the time to be ripe for a strike inside.

There are multiple forms of the patronage system in the country. There is a patronage system operated by the military. Then there is another run by the political parties, and finally there is a patron-client relationship between the military and the political class. The GHQ is adept in creating and nourishing politicians which it could co-opt as partners. The patronage system itself is no guarantee that the clients will always remain loyal. However, the patronage system is critical in keeping the political process constantly unstable and fragile. The military still has numerous options to exploit political players within the ruling party or amongst the opposition to create greater space for itself.

The current regime has to struggle with the military both in terms of space and time. It ought to be lucky in buying time to contest a formidable domestic rival that is the armed forces. The government's ability to make the economic clock tick, keep the US on its side, and make the military's existence rather superfluous through changing India-Pakistan relations are critical elements of such a change. Since the rivalry with India is viewed as the military's *raison d'être*, a redefinition of Pakistan-India relations is bound to reduce the significance of the military. However, in this respect a lot depends on changing the mindset in Delhi and making it understand the sensitivity of the situation. If the Indian government were able to solve some of the issues under discussion (not necessarily including Kashmir) and give some space to the present regime, it would tremendously help Islamabad in strengthening itself vis-à-vis the GHQ.

Without fundamental structural changes, civil-military relations will remain an almost never-ending game of chess. The developments after the breakup of the country in 1971 bear witness to the fact that the military as an organization is far more powerful to regroup and reorganize itself to make a come back even after it is considered a spent force. It would make use of its capacity to regroup even if the country might run the risk of further division. Pakistan is caught in a vicious spiral in which civil-military relations will only balance out if the armed forces weaken considerably or, as mentioned earlier, the political structure morph into a new shape.



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